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ABSTRACT
Web applications have become increasingly important in the last years. As more and
more applications deal with sensitive and confidential data, the quantity and negative
impact of security vulnerabilities has grown as well.
To understand this impact, this work presents a study over the most common and
risky security vulnerabilities seen on web applications today. Also, with the emerging
of the new HTML5 specification, an approach is made on how HTML5 will impact
web security. The goal is to describe the new features of HTML5 and demonstrate
how they may, or may not, introduce new security vulnerabilities to web applications.
Understanding the vulnerabilities is only the first step, as that knowledge is worth-
less if not applied into the software development life cycle. As so, this works performs
a detailed analysis over static analysis tools, methodologies and strategies. Static
analysis tools are very powerful, because they can help developers identifying possi-
ble vulnerabilities during all the development process.
Finally, this work compiles the information gathered in order to provide a set
of guidelines on how static analysis tools need to evolve to face the new challenges
presented by HTML5 and other emerging technologies. Also, a high level definition
for the structure of a static analysis platform is presented.
As a whole, this work intends to be a complete survey over web security vul-
nerabilities, how they can evolve with the arriving of HTML5 and how can this be
approached by static analysis tools.
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RESUMO
Ao longo dos u´ltimos anos, as aplicac¸o˜es web teˆm ganho especial importaˆncia. Com
cada vez mais aplicac¸o˜es a lidar com informac¸a˜o sens´ıvel e confidencial, o nu´mero e
o impacto das vulnerabilidades de seguranc¸a tem vindo a aumentar.
Para compreender este impacto, este trabalho fornece uma ana´lise sobre as vul-
nerabilidades de seguranc¸a que introduzem mais risco e que sa˜o mais comuns nas
aplicac¸o˜es web atuais. Com o emergir do HTML5, este trabalho pretende ainda es-
tudar com principal cuidado, o impacto que as novas funcionalidades do HTML5
podera˜o ter na seguranc¸a das aplicac¸o˜es web. O objectivo e´ apresentar as novas fun-
cionalidades do HTML5 e demonstrar de que forma estas podem, ou na˜o, introduzir
novas vulnerabilidades de seguranc¸a.
Compreender as vulnerabilidades e´ apenas o primeiro passo, porque esse conheci-
mento e´ inu´til se na˜o for aplicado durante o processo de desenvolvimento de software.
Assim, este trabalho fornece uma ana´lise sobre ferramentas, metodologias e estrate´gias
para ana´lise esta´tica de co´digo. As ferramentas de ana´lise esta´tica de co´digo sa˜o ex-
tremamente poderosas, pois permitem identificar vulnerabilidades durante todo o
processo de desenvolvimento de software.
Finalmente, este trabalho compila toda a informac¸a˜o reunida de forma a definir al-
gumas diretrizes sobre como devem evoluir as ferramentas de ana´lise esta´tica de co´digo
de forma a conseguirem acompanhar com as alterac¸o˜es introduzidas pelo HTML5 e
outras tecnologias emergentes. E´ ainda definido um modelo de alto nivel para a
estrutura de uma plataforma de ana´lise esta´tica de co´digo.
Concluindo, este trabalho pretende apresentar um estudo detalhado sobre vulner-
abilidade de seguranc¸a em aplicac¸o˜es web, como estas podem evoluir com a chegada
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In the last few years, the internet has suffering a major revolution. A web ap-
plication is no longer a set of pages where a user makes an HTTP request and the
server returns a static HTML page as response. Web technologies and languages had
evolved to enhance the interactivity between web applications and users, resulting in
dynamic and very sophisticated web applications which work as service providers.
People use web applications to do all their day-to-day business operations online,
and by doing that, they are trusting very sensitive information such as personal
information, credit card numbers, on-line banking accounts, etc. People trust their
web applications and this puts a great deal of responsibility on the service provider
to guarantee a secure and safe interaction.
As people are moving their operations to the web, business companies moved
their entire systems to the web. Most companies no longer have their own server
and their own resources. Their systems and services are being moved to the web
and we are watching to a paradigm-shift named cloud computing [Lee (2010); Zissis
and Lekkas (2012); Qian et al. (2009); IBM (2009)]. Moreover, with the growing of
cloud computing and the need for migrate more and more information to the cloud,
web security becomes a major issue and is still making some companies reluctant in




With the growing importance of web security, making secure software is critical,
and although most of the applications deal with sensitive data, only a small fraction
can afford a complete security review. Software review and testing are one of the
most expensive stages in software development, and companies very often overlook
this process.
Sometimes it’s not because companies don’t have the necessary time and resources
to review the security of an application but because companies don’t truly understand
the risks and the importance which these reviews represent. Even with a properly
security review, companies can’t take security for granted.
Despite the great deal of attention given by the literature to web security, and
the great improvement achieved, as web evolve and change so do hacking methods
[Cannings et al. (2008)], new technologies are released and new systems are deployed
every day, which makes the task of achieving total security almost impossible. The
fact is that without changing anything in a secure application, that application can
be compromised by a new threat never documented before.
All of this enforce the need for automated approaches to help developers in the
process of building secure software. There are a great number of tools to perform
this task, both open source and proprietary. This tools can, normally, be divided into
two main categories: tools to use during development, before deploy (static analy-
sis approaches) and tools to be used after deploy, with the system already running
(dynamic runtime approaches). They work differently, use different strategies with
different purposes and different results, but ultimately, all tools have the same goal:
identify and help correcting security flaws.
The current changes on the web, are introducing new challenges for both static
and dynamic approaches. With the growing complexity of web applications in the web
2.0, web applications are now built with multiple languages (both client and server-
side), divided between multiple layers, and reuse public libraries and frameworks.
The static analysis tools are having some troubles keeping up to this changes. Most
of them simply parse and analyze one language, and do it sequentially, ignoring the
complexity in the relations between layers, languages and frameworks.
A very strong example is the use of development frameworks. Using Java as
example, it’s inevitable the use of these frameworks (like Spring, Struts, JSF, etc)
when building JEE web applications. They provide a simple and enhanced devel-
opment environment for building web applications, making it easier to achieve high
2
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performance, simplicity and scalability.
This enforce the need for a more evolved solution, capable of understand the
relations and the complexity underlying a modern and complex web application. It’s
easy to find in the literature case studies which approach this needs, but in practice
they never get implemented in real open source tools, and the prototypes released
consist in very basic proof of concept implementations.
1.3 Aims and objectives
As described before, the number and importance of web applications is growing in
an impressive rate. Following this growth is also the importance of those applications
being secure, specially the ones dealing with sensitive data. As so, there is a common
background to all the stages of this work: analyze the current state of security on
modern web applications.
Drilling down on the subject, the first goal is to identify the most common cate-
gories of vulnerabilities present in web applications, understand how they have evolved
over time and how they are changing with the current changes on the internet.
Among these current changes, there is a major subject of interest: HTML5. Day
after day HTML5 is proving to be the near future of internet. As so, one of the most
important goals of this work is to study the impact which HTML5 can have on the
future of web security. So, the aim is to perform a complete analysis of the HTML5
specification, study each feature individually and understand which vulnerabilities
they may, or may not, introduce into a web application.
Understanding the threats and vulnerabilities against web applications it’s essen-
tial, but is worthless if that knowledge is not applied into the development process.
Automated tools to analyze the integrity and security of an application are needed
for both developers and security reviewers. As so, this work must present a detailed
analysis on static analysis tools and methodologies.
It must be described the process of building a static analysis tool, covering all
the stages of the process, and for each stage, identify the most common strategies,
frameworks and methodologies used. Also, an analysis must be made over the existing
open source tools, clearly identifying their strengths, weaknesses and strategies.
Then, a set of guidelines must be defined to approach how static analysis tools
need to evolve in order to keep up with the constant changes and challenges faced
by web applications. This guidelines include an analysis over what’s missing on the
current open source tools available. With those guidelines, a high level definition for
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the structure of a platform capable of performing static analysis is presented. This
platform must always look for scalability and for modularity but it must be mainly
focused on Java and HTML5 languages.
To sum up, this dissertation intends to provide two main outputs: The first one
is to provide a survey on the state of web security, to list and describe the current
security vulnerabilities seen in web applications today, and to understand how they are
evolving with the emerging of new technologies and methodologies, specially HTML5.
The second contribution is to define a set of guidelines on how static analysis tools
need to evolve to keep up with the constant changes and challenges faced by web
applications. Along with these guidelines, a proposal for a static analysis platform
must be presented in the form of a high level model.
1.4 Structure of the document
In this introductory chapter, a contextualization of the problem was made and
the main goals and guidelines for this work were defined and described.
Next, in chapter 2, a detailed survey over web security is made, identifying and
defining the main categories of vulnerabilities seen on web applications today.
Chapter 3 shows how HTML5 affects the security of web applications, and what
impact it can have on the vulnerabilities presented in chapter 2.
Then, in chapter 4, a background over static analysis tools, methodologies and
strategies is presented, as well as examples of open sources static analysis tools avail-
able.
In chapter 5, the security knowledge from chapters 2 and 3, and the static analysis
knowledge from chapter 4 is compiled together into a theoritical approach for a static
analysis tool.
One final chapter shows the conclusions taken from this work, identifies the main




The growing integration of business systems into the web is moving more and
more sensitive information into the web. Consequently, the number and the impact
of security vulnerabilities on web applications is increasing in an impressive rate. A
Symantec’s security report [Symantec (2013)] published on April of 2013, shows that
targeted attacks increased 42% in 2012, with a global average of 116 targeted attacks
per day. A targeted attack is a specific kind of attack that is specially designed and
has the specific goal of attacking one organization or industry. In the same report is
shown that (see Figure 2.1) in 2012, it were identified 5291 new types of vulnerabilities,
comparing to 4,989 of the year before and the 6,253 from 2010. Even with the general
effort of all companies and entities in the software business, the general trend over
time is to an increase of both the number of attacks and the number of vulnerabilities
found.
Each vulnerability has different characteristics and can put at risk one application
in many different ways. To measure that risk, it’s important to understand what kind
of attacks can exploit that vulnerability, and the impact which the attack can have
on the system.
To rank that impact, a compilation of the ten most critical security vulnerabilities
in web applications has been done in [OWASP (2010)]. This is a project from OWASP
community, dated of 2010, and it’s a reference when talking about the security of web
applications. The ten vulnerabilities composing the top, ordered decreasingly by its
risk, are the following:
• A1 - Injection
• A2 - Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
• A3 - Broken Authentication and Session Management
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Figure 2.1: Trend of new vulnerabilities found each year, Symantec (2013).
• A4 - Insecure Direct Object References
• A5 - Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
• A6 - Security Misconfiguration
• A7 - Insecure Cryptographic Storage
• A8 - Failure to Restrict URL Access
• A9 - Insufficient Transport Layer Protection
• A10 - Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards
To complete this approach and to better understand the attacks, during this
chapter, it will be used a methodology from [Cannings et al. (2008)], in which the
impact of an attack is characterized by three factors:
Popularity
The frequency in which an attack is used: 1 being most rare, and 10 being
widely used.
Simplicity
The degree of skill that is needed to perform an attack which exploits the vul-
nerability: 10 being little or none, and 1 being great level of skill and experience.
Impact
The potential damage which an attack can cause, if it is successfully performed:
1 being the revelation of non-important information about the target, and 10
being acquire superuser privileges or equivalent.
6
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Now, this methodology will be applied into each one of the 10 vulnerabilities of the
OWASP Top 10 presented above. Each vulnerability will be ranked within these three
factors (Popularity, Simplicity and Impact). The grades and justifications presented
below are based on the OWASP considerations for the Top 10 and in the analysis
made by Cannings et al. (2008) when using this methodology.
2.1 Injection
Popularity: 9 Simplicity: 9 Impact: 10
Injection vulnerabilities [Su and Wassermann (2006), Cannings et al. (2008)] rep-
resent a major threat to the security of an application. This vulnerability can be
exploited with common attacks like SQL injection, LDAP injection, XPATH injec-
tion or command injection.
Web applications are typically built in a two or more tiered architecture, consisting
of, at least, one application running on a web server and a back-end database to
store persistent data. When the input is not properly validated, and there is no
strict separation between program instructions and user data, the attackers can sneak
program instructions into places where the developer expects only to be data.
One common type of injection attack is SQL injection. SQL is the standard
language for accessing databases and almost every application uses a SQL database
to store persistent data. Because SQL syntax mix instructions with user data, the
user data can be interpreted as instructions and be used to execute operations in the
database. SQL injection attacks are very common, very simple to perform and can
severely compromise a system. SQL Injection attacks can result in almost everything
from data loss or corruption to a complete takeover of the database server. SQL
Injection vulnerabilities are easier to detect when examining code, and more difficult
via dynamic testing.
Another type of injection attack is XPath Injection. The problem is similar to SQL
injection but, in this case, the sensitive data is stored in XML documents rather than
a SQL Database. XPath it’s a query language, created by developers for interpreting
XML documents and, like SQL, XPath also has injection issues.
Like SQL injection, XPath injection attacks are relatively simple to perform, and
can have a serious impact on the system. However, these kind of attacks are much less
common than SQL injection attacks, because there are much more web applications
using SQL Databases.
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Another, well known and popular type of injection attacks are command injection.
This kind of attacks happens when the attacker can inject system commands, and
execute them in the server. This is more common in languages like PHP or PERL,
and much less common in languages like Java or C#. A command injection attack
takes advantages of improperly validated user input to inject system commands into
the server. Then, in operations like system calls, those commands are executed, and
can grant the attacker access, or even control of the server. Command injection
attacks can have a serious impact on the system and are very simple to perform.
There are still a few injection attacks (like Buffer Overflows or LDAP injection)
not described before. However, all injection attacks have a common property: all of
them depend on the ability of the attacker to inject malicious data into critical places
in the system.
One strategy to prevent against injection is to perform a good input validation
(or sanitization). When validating input, it’s important to constraint data types (e.g.
if the input should be an integer, then it should only be accepted, if it is a valid
integer), correctly escape strings (escaping special characters that can be used in a
query or command), or even check the input against a list of known good values.
But, the very best strategy is to use specific API’s. There are a few good API’s
which can, and should, be used to defend against injection. The most commons API’s
take advantage of a parameterized interface, to separate instructions from user data.
A well-known and very effective approach against SQL Injection is Prepared State-
ments. Prepared statements are a very simple way to create SQL queries and are
supported by all the main databases providers. When using prepared statements the
database is able to distinguish between instructions and user data without jeopar-
dizing performance. In fact, prepared statements were introduced as a performance
optimization. However, this approach does not work so well when the queries are
dynamically constructed (e.g. a page with different options that user can choose).
As a whole, injection attacks don’t need a great level of expertise and can be
performed from the user’s browser in a simple and direct way. So, simplicity level is
defined to 9.
Injection attacks were, for several years, the most popular and common web attack.
However, in the last years, with the shift for the so called web 2.0 [Cannings et al.
(2008)], and the rising of client-side technologies (e.g. AJAX, HTML5) XSS attacks
become more and more common. Also, the biggest slice of injection vulnerabilities
comes from SQL Injection which, with the use of prepared statements, decrease sig-
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nificantly. However, and for multiple reasons, there are still a big number of web
applications which don’t use prepared statements. So, popularity level is defined to
9.
As defined in the [OWASP (2010)], ”Injection can result in data loss or corruption,
lack of accountability, or denial of access. Injection can sometimes lead to complete
host takeover” and so, impact level is defined to 10.
Because they are so dangerous, so popular and so easily exploitable, injection vul-
nerabilities are placed in the first place of the top 10.
2.2 Cross-Site Scripting
Popularity: 10 Simplicity: 8 Impact: 9
In the class of web security vulnerabilities, the most prevalent flaw is Cross-Site
Scripting (usually abbreviated as XSS) [Garcia-Alfaro and Navarro-Arribas (2007);
Cannings et al. (2008); Louw and Venkatakrishnan (2009); Shanmugam and Pon-
navaikko (2008)]. XSS attacks occur when dynamically generated web pages display
input which has not been properly validated. The name Cross-Site Scripting is derived
from the fact that, an attacker can inject malicious scripts across security boundaries
to a vulnerable, but trusted Website. XSS can be used to perform a very popular
attack named phishing.
There are a variety of security controls and policies placed in web browsers to
restrict JavaScript in a set of operations [Jim et al. (2007); Cannings et al. (2008)].
Also, browsers are always evolving and implementing new security controls. A suc-
cessful XSS attack, depends on his ability to circumvent these controls and policies,
and inject the malicious script into the browser. Sometimes, the security controls may
work well but the security is compromised by exploring browser external plug-ins and
features like Flash, Silverlight, Acrobat Reader, etc.
From all security controls and policies there are one main policy which underlies
all the policies in all web browsers: the same origin policy. This policy defines that
dynamic content, like JavaScript, only can interpret responses from the same origin
where it came from. An origin is defined as a host name, a protocol and a port. The
same origin policy it’s essential because ensures that malicious websites cannot access
other websites, and browsers only execute scripts from trusted websites. Later in this
document, it will be explained how HTML5 directly breaks this security policy, and
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what impact can this have in the future of XSS atttacks.
XSS are the most popular attacks on the web today, and don’t require a great
level of skills to be performed. Typically, if successful, a XSS attack does not result
in compromising the user’s machine. However, the attacker can use a XSS attack to
steal cookies, hijack user sessions, temper with the website content, redirect users,
introduce malware, etc.
XSS attacks are usually categorized into two categories: stored and reflected.
Reflected (or non-persistent) are the most common XSS attacks. The malicious
JavaScript is not stored on a server, and the user is lured into clicking in a link
or submitting a form that immediately generates the malicious code (as part of an
input) and send it to the vulnerable web server. The server reflects it back to the
user’s browser, which executes the code without any problem because it comes from
a trusted web server.
In stored (or persistent) XSS attacks, the malicious JavaScript is stored in the vul-
nerable web server. A simple example is when the JavaScript is stored in a database:
when the user request some information which is stored in the database, he will re-
ceive the malicious code instead, and his browser will execute it because it comes
from a trusted web server.
With the rising of web 2.0, new XSS categories has emerged like DOM-based XSS.
In this case, the attacker takes advantage of the Document Object Model (DOM) and
the client-side JavaScript to execute the malicious code.
To prevent XSS attacks it’s necessary to do a properly input validation, but this
validation is not trivial at all. Like injection flaws, a possible strategy is to properly
escape all input by constraint data types, correctly escape all input text or even
compare the input to a list of known good values.
But Cross-Site Scripting is a little more complex to prevent than injections. As
stated before, some XSS attacks can take advantage, for example, from external
browser plug-ins and features.
Much like injection, XSS attacks don’t need a great level of expertise, and can be
performed directly from the user’s browser. So, simplicity level is also defined to 8.
Popularity level of XSS attacks is defined to 10. XSS attacks not only are the most
popular and common attacks on the web today, as they will become more and more
popular with the emerging of technologies like HTML5.
As defined in the [OWASP (2010)], ”Attackers can execute scripts in a victim’s
browser to hijack user sessions, deface web sites, insert hostile content, redirect users,
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hijack the user’s browser using malware, etc.”. However, the impact is not as severe
as in injection and so, the level of impact in XSS vulnerabilities is defined to 9 and
they are placed in the OWASP Top 10 as the second most risky vulnerability.
2.3 Broken Authentication and Session Management
Popularity: 8 Simplicity: 6 Impact: 10
The process of authentication plays an essential role in a web application, defining
which information and services the user is able to access and what is the role of the
user in the system. Authentication is normally performed by asking the user for a
username and a password.
Session management [OWASP (2013c)] is another very important process and
often overlooked in the development. Sessions are maintained by the server, which
creates a session for each client interacting with it. When a server receives a new
HTTP request from a client, a session ID is generated by the server and sent back to
the client within the HTTP response. This session ID uniquely identifies the client
interacting with the server. After this first connection, the session ID is always passed
within all requests sent and received between client and server. Session management
includes all tasks made in both client and server sides to establish and maintain the
sessions active and secure.
To prevent authentication vulnerabilities [OWASP (2013a)] is very important to
implement strong password and password recovery mechanisms. A strong password
worths nothing, if an attacker is able to gain access to an account with the password
recovery mechanism. The error messages can also tell an attacker much about an
account. As so, error messages must be generic and not give the attacker any leads
about what went wrong. If fact, this is not valid only for authentication proposes.
Error messages should be treated with care in all applications contents as they can
give an attacker useful leads to system vulnerabilities. The user should also be granted
with a limited number of attempts to correctly insert his credentials. If not, a brute
force attack could be performed. Another important measure is to store all passwords
with a strong and secure encryption. If not, and if an attacker gains access to the
system’s password database (e.g. with an SQL injection attack), the attacker would
have access to all user’s accounts and data.
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All the communications between server and client are made via HTTP, a stateless
protocol. As so, all the session management mechanisms have to be implemented by
the developer, and it becomes its responsibility to ensure the security of the process
and to prevent session management vulnerabilities [OWASP (2013c)]. To achieve
this, a secure session management mechanism must start with an efficient generation
of session identifiers. The name of the session ID should not be descriptive as it should
not provide any information about the session ID itself, the system or implementation
details. Much like a strong password, a session ID must be long enough to prevent
brute force attacks and must have a random component to make it impossible to
guess with statistical analysis techniques. Also, the content of the session ID must be
restricted to the information which is absolutely necessary to identify the client, and
should never include any kind of sensitive information about the user, the system or
even the operation in progress.
It’s very common for developers to build their own authentication and session
management systems and, consequently, many of this systems have vulnerabilities.
However, as each implementation has its own characteristics, finding flaws is not
trivial at all. In fact, finding this kind of vulnerabilities can be very difficult and
only possible to attackers with a certain level of expertise. So, the simplicity level is
awarded to 6.
The impact which this vulnerabilities can have on a system is very severe. If an
attacker is able to steal user credentials, or access the system on behalf of another
user, the attacker can do anything the victim could do and access all of the victim’s
information. The consequences become even more severe if the attacker successfully
perform this attack in sensitive system like banking or e-commerce, or if the attacker
get access to privileged accounts. As so, the impact level is defined to 10 and they
appear on the third place of the Top 10.
Authentication and session management attacks are not as common as XSS or SQL
injection, mainly because this vulnerabilities are not so simple to exploit. However,
getting access to user’s credentials and information is one of most desirable aims for
attackers, and so popularity level is defined to 8.
2.4 Insecure Direct Object References
Popularity: 7 Simplicity: 9 Impact: 8
In a communication between server and client, there are multiple parameters
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which allows the client to send application data within the request to the server,
and the server to understand the request. If a web application exposes an internal
implementation object to the user, by directly reference it in one of this parameters,
an attacker can modify it in an attempt to access objects which he doesn’t have
permission for. This references can be present either as URL or form parameters,
and can reference files, directories, database records and primary keys.
A very common vulnerability in the category of Insecure Direct Object References,
is Directory Traversal [Cannings et al. (2008)]. If a web application open files based
on parameters, the attacker can deliberately change this parameters to read arbitrary
files on web servers.
Another very common example within this category of vulnerabilities is Open
Redirects [Cannings et al. (2008)]. If the web application has a parameter which al-
lows the user to be redirected to another page, the attacker can change this parameter
and lure potential victims to a malicious website of his choice.
To prevent Insecure Direct Object References, developers should use indirect ref-
erences and limit the mapping to values authorized for each user. A white list defining
which objects the user is allowed to access is a simple and effective solution. By ref-
erence the objects indirectly, the developer is not exposing names, URL’s or database
keys, making the attacker task much more difficult.
Direct mapping can easily be guessed by attackers and be performed by any user
within his browser with simple parameter tampering. The attacker just have to un-
derstand a little about the logic of web applications and he will easily guess paths and
variables that will lead him to sensitive information. If that information is not prop-
erly saved with authentication methods, the attack will be succeeded. So, simplicity
level is defined to 9.
The risk introduced by this vulnerabilities depends on the information that the
attacker is able to find. A successfully attack will may be able to steal sensitive
information which he was not suppose to have access to, but hardly will become in
a DOS attack or have consequences to the application performance. Consequently, it
receives 8 for impact.
Attacks over insecure direct object references are not as popular as the ones pre-
sented above, but due to the fact that they don’t need a great level of expertise and
they can lead to sensitive information, they are still very common and receive 7 for
popularity.
13
CHAPTER II. WEB SECURITY
2.5 Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
Popularity: 8 Simplicity: 7 Impact: 9
Cross-site request forgery (usually abbreviated as XSRF or CSRF) allows a ma-
licious website, visited by the victim, to perform actions in a vulnerable application,
taking advantage of the victim’s access and privilege level on that application.
CSRF attacks leverage from the inherent statelessness of the web applications
and authenticated users (recall that for authentication proposes, the user’s browser
store a session ID and that session ID is sent in all the requests to and from the
server). So, the malicious website forces the victim’s browser to make a GET or
POST HTTP request to the vulnerable web application, with query parameters or
form field values and, consequently, the victim’s browser will send the authentication
credentials along with the request, and the attacker will be able to perform actions
in behalf of the victim. Of course that, for this attacks to be succeeded, the user has
to be authenticated.
It’s intuitive to think that the same-origin policy (explained later in chapter 3)
will not allow this to happen. In fact, the same-origin policy makes it impossible
to the attacker’s malicious website to read any data related to the victim’s account,
but, the attacker is still able to blindly cause the victim’s browser to make the HTTP
request, which is enough to perform the attack.
Preventing CSRF is done by including a unique token in the body of each HTTP
Request. The token should be unique for each HTTP request or, at least, for each
user session. The browser has the session ID stored, and sends it in the request,
but, does not have the secret token, and so, the request will go without it and the
server will be able to reject the request. The secret value can be a session ID stored
in a client-side cookie or a random value generated from a cryptographically secure
random number generator.
There are more rudimentary ways to prevent CSRF like, for example, every time
the user performs a sensitive operation, the system can ask the user for his password.
Off course this is not the most pleasant way, but it is a very strong policy and can
be a good strategy to enhance security for very-sensitive operations like changing
password, banking transactions, etc.
Despite the extremely dangerous nature of CSRF attacks, during several years,
these attacks have received less attention than the more easily understood web appli-
cation vulnerabilities such as XSS or Injection. However, in the last few years, they
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began to be taken seriously and listing in the OWASP Top 10 project was achieved
in 2007. Even in 2007, they entered directly into the fifth place and they maintained
their position in the 2010 top. With a successfully CSRF attack, the attacker is able
to perform any action that the victim can perform, and change any information that
the victim is allowed to change. As so, impact level is defined to 9.
CSRF vulnerabilities are relatively simple to exploit. However, the attacker still
needs a little knowledge to build a malicious website, and the ability to lure the victim
into access it. Simplicity level for CSRF is then defined to 7.
Despite the fact that CSRF is very easy to prevent and detect, there are still a
great number of web applications vulnerable to it. Consequently, CSRF attacks are
very common and there are still reports about this kind of attacks targeting big and
relevant systems. As so, popularity level is defined to 8.
2.6 Security Misconfiguration
Popularity: 7 Simplicity: 6 Impact: 10
Security Misconfiguration vulnerabilities are the result of configuration weaknesses
found in web applications. This category of vulnerabilities is very easy to understand,
but includes a very wide range of possible flaws. A simple misconfiguration can
seriously compromise the security of a web application and it can be present in any
level of an application. A misconfiguration in an application level framework can
introduce a vulnerability in the same way as a misconfiguration in a web server can.
To prevent this kind of attacks it’s important to keep all systems up to date
(including OS, Web and application servers, DBMS, frameworks, libraries, etc). Also,
regular verification and testing is needed.
It’s important to carefully configure remote server accesses. Remote interfaces
present an attractive window to opportunistic attackers. A misconfiguration in the
process and the window become even bigger.
A very dangerous misconfiguration is the use of default or weak passwords and
incorrect permissions set. Default passwords are public and should never be used.
It’s essential to use strong passwords and a well defined permission scheme.
Another very important configuration is error handling. Error messages in a web
application should be treated with care and should not give any useful information
to the attacker about the system. The less the attackers knows, the lower is the
probability of him successfully finding a vulnerability in the system.
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Many applications come with unnecessary and unsafe features. Unnecessary fea-
tures must be disabled and avoided. If an unsafe feature is really necessary, contra-
measures must be implemented.
Misconfiguration may provide means for an attacker to bypass authentication
methods and gain access to sensitive information and places, perhaps with elevated
privileges. Misconfiguration can even result in a complete system compromise. So,
impact level is defined to 10.
To take advantage of poor configurations, a great level of skill is needed. To
successfully perform an attack exploiting this vulnerabilities, the attacker needs to
understand all the technologies (frameworks, servers, libraries, etc) in which the ap-
plication is built. Then, he needs to understand the strengths and weaknesses of the
technology he is exploiting, and understand where are the possible flaws that may
give him a way in. On top of this, the attacker needs skill and knowledge to perform
the attack. Simplicity level is, then, defined to 6.
Mainly because these vulnerabilities are harder to exploit then the previous ones
presented, they are not so popular. They are very dangerous, but they need a greater
level of expertise and time, and different applications need different approaches. As
so, popularity level is defined to 7.
2.7 Insecure Cryptographic Storage
Popularity: 6 Simplicity: 6 Impact: 8
Strong cryptography is a critical piece of information security that can be ap-
plied at many levels, from data storage to network communication. One of the most
common categories of security problems is the misapplication of cryptography in stor-
age. If an attacker gains access to some sensitive information and that information is
stored without encryption, the attacker will have no problem reading it. Developers
and administrators sometimes make the deceptively assumption that their system is
100% secure, and so, encryption is not so important. There are no totally secure
systems, and in the event of a successful attack, the attacker will be able to easily
read non-encrypted information. On the other hand, with a proper encryption, even
with a successful attack, the sensitive data may not be compromised as the attacker
may not be able to decrypt it.
Cryptography it’s an area which can look deceptively easy, when in reality there
are an overwhelming number of pitfalls. It’s a very wide area and, in the context of
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this work, will not be specified with much detail.
To prevent this vulnerabilities to happen, it’s essential the use of secure and
standard encryption algorithms. Also, the encryption keys and passwords used must
be secure and can not, in any way, be compromised.
Insecure cryptographic storage may lead to the compromise of sensitive infor-
mation. But, that’s not possible if the attacker don’t get to the information first,
exploiting another flaw. So, impact level is defined to 8.
Taking advantage of this kind of vulnerabilities directly depends on how insecure is
the encryption. If there is no encryption, then no skill is needed. As the encryption
quality increases, so the skill needed to perform the attack. Simplicity level is, then,
defined to 6.
The attacker normally tries to get the information first, not knowing if it is properly
encrypted or not. So, the attacker don’t exactly exploit this vulnerabilities. On top
of that, this vulnerabilities don’t are very common and so, popularity level is defined
to 6.
2.8 Failure to Restrict URL Access
Popularity: 5 Simplicity: 10 Impact: 8
This category of vulnerabilities occur when developers don’t properly check if the
user has permission to access a particular page. If not, an attacker can easily change
the URL to a page which he does not have permission for, and access the information
like an authorized user.
To prevent this vulnerability, a developer just need to guarantee that, for each
page, a verification of the user access level is done. If the user is not allowed to
open the page, then, the request must be blocked. For this to be done efficiently,
it’s important to have a well defined permissions scheme which identifies, clearly, the
access level for each user.
Exploiting flaws of non-restricted URL access is very simple. The attacker just
needs to change the URL to the page he doesn’t have permission for and, if the
vulnerability exists, he will be granted with access immediately. So, simplicity level
is defined to 10.
This is a very well understood set of vulnerabilities. Developers understand ex-
actly what can happen if they don’t check before granting access to a page. So, the
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number of this vulnerabilities is really low and consequently, the number of attacks
performed is also very low. Popularity level is defined to 5.
In a successfully performed attack, the attacker gains complete access to the in-
formation and functionalities that a user with more permissions would have. So, this
kind of vulnerabilities can seriously compromise sensitive and confidential informa-
tion. Impact level is defined to 8.
2.9 Insufficient Transport Layer Protection
Popularity: 8 Simplicity: 5 Impact: 9
Insufficient transport layer protection can introduce vulnerabilities in two scenar-
ios: when malicious traffic are interpreted by the web server, or when network packets,
not properly secured, are intercepted by an attacker.
Malicious traffic consists in data packets that, when interpreted by the server and
executed in the software, can compromise sensitive information, the server execution
or even the user’s machine.
To prevent this scenario, proper tools and protocols must be used. Firewalls and
intrusion detection systems (IDSs) are two types of tools that must be used to deal
with potentially malicious network traffic, both on client and server sides.
SSL(Secure Sockets Layer) protocol must be used to secure communications be-
tween client and server. SSL allows the client and server to communicate over an
encrypted channel with message integrity in which the client can authenticate the
server. Frequently, developers use SSL only during authentication, what can compro-
mise the security of sensitive data, including session IDs. So, a web application must,
at all times, require a well-defined SSL for all sensitive pages.
The server certificate is also very important because they help protecting users
from deceitful activities. Basically, the certificate is a proof you show to the user to
ensure him that you are who you’re saying, and not someone else posing as you. So,
the server certificate must be legitimate, well configured and up-to-date.
To explore this vulnerabilities, an attacker needs to understand, not only from web
applications architecture, but also from network protocols and technologies. Of the
OWASP Top 10, this is probably the set of vulnerabilities more difficult to exploit.
As so, it receives 5 for simplicity.
Transport layer vulnerabilities can expose user’s sensitive and confidential infor-
mation. If the attacker accesses to an administrator’s account information, the system
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can be compromised. As so, impact level is defined to 9.
Exploits for this category of vulnerabilities are very common. Besides being hard
to exploit, they are very dangerous and so, become very tempting for possible attack-
ers. As so, popularity level is defined to 8.
2.10 Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards
Popularity: 6 Simplicity: 8 Impact: 7
Web applications regularly redirect users between pages (internal or external).
This can introduce a vulnerability, if the destiny page is specified in a parameter
defined by the user. Consequently, an attacker can very easily temper with the
parameter and redirect potential victims to a malicious page.
To prevent this vulnerabilities, the best approach is definitively not using redirec-
tions coming from parameters. There are very few situations where this solution is
needed. However, if the situation strictly requires this solution, then a proper valida-
tion must be applied verifying if the the destiny is valid and authorized for the user.
A white list verification, with a comparison against a list of authorized destinies is a
very good solution.
The required skill to exploit this vulnerabilities is not very high. An attacker just
need to modify the parameter to the URL of his choice in order to redirect the victim
into the malicious page. The victim trusts the application and, so, he will not get
any suspicious about being redirected. The simplicity level is defined to 8.
These category of vulnerabilities is not very common. Mainly because there a few
case scenarios where a parameter based redirection is needed. As so, popularity level
is defined to 6.
The impact which an attack exploiting this vulnerabilities can have, depends on
the malicious website for which the victim will be redirected. The malicious page can
do anything from installing malware until convincing the victim into grant confidential
information. The attack just works as a path to make the victim visiting the malicious
page. Nothing really happens in the application. So, impact level is defined to 7.
2.11 Summary
In this chapter, it was completed the first goal defined to this dissertation: identify
the most common categories of vulnerabilities present in web applications.
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This was made using the ten vulnerabilities presented by OWASP in their Top 10
of 2010 and a methodology from Cannings et al. (2008). Following this methodology,
each category of vulnerabilities was evaluated based on three factors: popularity,
simplicity and impact. Were also described some attacks which each vulnerability
can lead to and some pointers on how to avoid them.
The next step is to study the HTML5 specification, and understand how the new
features can impact the vulnerabilities described in this chapter.
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How is web security evolving with
HTML5
Most of the web applications seen today are built in HTML4, the standard intro-
duced in 1997. But, in the last decade, the web and the way we use it has changed
dramatically. With the growing need for interactivity in web 2.0, web applications
logic is significantly shifting from the server to the browser.
”With the inability of the HTML4 to follow this advances, web developers tried
to fill the gap by adopting a variety of new technologies that use a combination of
Javascript, DOM and XHTML communication, or by including third-party plug-ins
like Flash or Silverlight.
As a successor of HTML 4.01 and XHTML 1.1, is now emerging the Hypertex
Markup Language, version 5 (HTML5). It was founded by the Web Hypertext Ap-
plication Technology Working Group (WHATWG) in 2004, but only later named
of HTML5. But, HTML5 is not a common upgrade, it’s actually a whole lot of
new individual features to enrich and enhance web applications”, [Michael Schmidt
(2011)].
With this change from server to browser processing, browser security is gaining
even more relevance. Browsers are relatively secure, and in general, the number of
security vulnerabilities found in web browsers is dropping every year. Still, a big
number of vulnerabilities were reported during the last year in the most popular web
browsers. Furthermore, there is another critical entrypoint for security vulnerabilities,
the so called third-party plug-ins.
In Figure 3.1, it’s presented a comparison based on the percentage of vulnerabili-
ties found during the last three years, for the most popular browsers and plug-ins.
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Figure 3.1: Browser/Plug-in vulnerabilities 2010-2012, [Symantec (2013)].
The role played by browsers in web security will grow even more over time, as
HTML5 is being implemented. Moreover, and despite its great acceptance, concerns
about the security of the new features of HTML5 persist. Like in every new technol-
ogy, new features bring new security concerns and can be the root cause for new attack
vectors. XSS attacks will get even more relevance and the browser will definitely be
the most critical point when addressing web security.
In this chapter, the main goal is to analyze the new HTML5 specification and the
implications it can have on web security. For each of the most important HTML5
features, it will be given a little description about its usefulness followed by an anal-
ysis over the security consequences it can bring. In addition to bring new security
vulnerabilities, HTML5 will impact some of the existing ones.
In chapter 2, an analysis over the most popular categories of vulnerabilities was
made. But, the analysis was mainly focused on a set of categories usually known as
server-side vulnerabilities. So, this chapter will start by filling the gap on another
perspective: client-side vulnerabilities, which can compromise the user’s browser and
computer, but usually have no consequences over the application’s behavior or infor-
mation.
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Also in this chapter, in order to better understand the concept and the con-
sequences of client-side vulnerabilities, it will be made an analysis over a typical
browser architecture and the main security policies surrounding it. The fact is that,
when evaluating the new HTML5 specification and his security risks, a web browser
takes special importance. In fact, most of the new features security is browser re-
sponsibility. Browser vendors are working in the implementation and they are doing
it with extreme care, but like always, they are doing it independently from each other
and the same features work differently in different browsers.
That’s not a goal of this chapter to prove, in any way, that HTML5 is insecure.
In fact, HTML5 was designed with integrated security, probably like any language
before. In the language specification 1, each feature has its own subsection with
security considerations, describing how the feature must be implemented and what
are the consequences of a poor implementation. But, at the same time, the language
is going to be complex and support a wide variety of functions that are currently
handled by multiple plug-ins. This sort of broad functionality, in general, tends to
raise the potential for attacks.
3.1 Browser Security Policies and Client-Side Vulnerabilities
The shift of the application business from the server to the browser implies a
shifting in the technologies used.
Technologies like Flash or Silverlight, that are around longer, have been integrated
into the browser as external plug-ins. On the other hand, HTML5 features are directly
integrated into the browser, and don’t need any plug-in to run. Eventually, it should
be expectable from all browsers to have a similar set of features but, for now, browsers
are in very different stages of development. As so, browser compatibility is, and
will continue to be a significant issue regarding HTML5. For now, the HTML5
specification is in the development stages and, some browsers may choose not to
adopt a specific API right away (due to instability, ambiguity or other issues with the
specification).
Every change made in the technologies used can impact the browser’s model, and
can introduce possible security faults. Figure 3.2 represents a browser model:
1HTML5 Language Specification, 2013: ”http://www.w3.org/TR/html-markup/”
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Figure 3.2: Browser architectural layers, [OWASP (2011)].
Core Policies. This layer defines the security mechanisms of a browser. Here,
are defined mechanisms and policies responsible for ensuring the security in all the
browser features. Of all security policies, there is one that takes special importance,
which is the Same Origin Policy. HTML5 relaxes this policy by introducing a new
policy called CORS (Cross Origin Resource Sharing).
Network & Access. This layer defines the browser connectivity services like
XHR (versions 1 and 2), web sockets, plug-in specific sockets and the browser native
network services. Plug-ins like Flash, Silverlight and other plug-ins have their own
socket implementation. HTML5 uses web sockets and XHR (v2) requests.
Process & Logic. This is the core layer in a browser, as it defines components
like Javascript, DOM, Events, Parser and Threads. HTML5 add several new features
to this layer, like WebSQL, storage and enhanced DOM.
Presentation. Layer which defines the direct interaction with the end user. The
most basic presentation component are the HTML tags. Also, HTML5 introduces a
new set of tags which are directly integrated into the browser features, as they don’t
need a plug-in. Also in this layer are plug-ins like Flash, Silverlight, etc.
The HTML5 enhancements radically change the attack model for the browser.
With more local storage and oﬄine caching, the browser will contain much more
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sensitive data and will make the browser an even more attractive target. As so, the
standards which define the browsers policies and security, are going through a full
renovation.
There are multiple attack vectors that explore the browser model. Figure 3.3,
shows how different kind of threats can affect browser’s layers.
Figure 3.3: Browser attack vectors, [OWASP (2011)].
In Figure 3.3, ten possible threats are identified, distributed by the four layers,
and all of them have one common property: they all are introduced or improved by
the HTML5 specification.
During the course of this chapter, it will be described specific vulnerabilities in-
troduced by HTML5.
3.2 Introducing API and Vulnerabilities
Figure 3.4 shows a high level diagram, which shows how HTML5 features relate
to each other. This diagram briefly some the HTML5 features, and more important,
explains the relationships between them from a browser context. The diagram, and
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the respective relationships, are explained in the report [Michael Schmidt (2011)] as
follows:
”DomainA.csnc.ch represents the origin of the loaded website which embeds three
Iframes of different sources. The Iframe loaded from untrusted.csnc.ch is executed in
a sandbox and does not have the permission to execute JavaScript code. The Iframes
loaded from anydomainA.csnc.ch and anydomainB.csnc.ch are communicating to each
other making use of Web Messaging. Custom scheme and content handlers are reg-
istered by domainB.csnc.ch which is requested if the user requests an appropriate
resource. From domainC.csnc.ch additional resources are loaded using Cross Origin
Resource Sharing. Geolcation API, Oﬄine Web Application, Web Storage and Web
Workers represent HTML5 UA features that can be used by the websites. In this
example anydomainB.csnc.ch exemplarily makes use of all these features”.
Figure 3.4: HTML5 security overview by Compass, [Michael Schmidt (2011)]
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3.2.1 CORS - Cross Origin Resource Sharing
XMLHttpRequests is a very commonly used communication API in modern appli-
cations used with the AJAX technology. Prior to CORS, these requests were limited
to communications within the same domain. CORS enables XHR communication to
be made across different domains. This is probably the feature in HTML5 with the
most potential to introduce security problems because it reduces the most fundamen-
tal security policy in a browser, the Same Origin Policy.
With the Same Origin Policy, a website can only communicate and access resources
within their origin domain. This is a good and secure policy but it imposes some lim-
itations, specially for web applications which are composed of several different parts
displaying data from multiple origins at the same time. Usually, to bypass this lim-
itation, developers use a proxy server compromising the efficiency of the application
and introducing another point of failure to the system.
As stated before, CORS makes it possible to communicate across domains with
XHR. This can be achieved by defining a new HTTP Header ”Access-Control-Allow-
Origin”, which allows the developer to define the list of domains authorized to access
response. A simple and well defined example of this header is as follows:
Access−Control−Allow−Orig in : ” http :// example .um. pt”
Listing 1: Good implementation of a CORS header
By placing this header in an HTTP response, a developer is defining that only web
applications with its origin domain from ”example.um.pt” are allowed to access the
response. All the other requests from foreign domains will be block and will fail when
attempting to access the response.
This feature overcomes all the limitations introduced by the Same Origin Policy
and brings a all new dynamic to web applications, specially the ones built out of many
parts from multiple origins. It also makes implementations easier, but without the
proper use by developers it can seriously compromise the security of an application.
This is not completely new, Flash has a similar mechanism which uses a file
named ”crossdomain.xml” to define a list of authorized domains. But also, Flash is
documented as an exploitable plugin, and this file has been the route cause for some
documented vulnerabilities.
In the most trivial situation we will see developers setting the header like this:
Access−Control−Allow−Orig in : ”∗”
Listing 2: Bad implementation of a CORS header
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By placing this header in an HTTP response, a developer is allowing the communi-
cation with any domain, allowing a XHR to be sent across multiple domains without
asking the user for permission. This open a big range of possible attack vectors
[Michael Schmidt (2011); McArdle (2011a); OWASP (2013b); Kuppan (2010); Ryck
et al. (2011)]:
Session Hijacking. By allowing the communication with any domain, the at-
tacker would be able to make requests on behalf of a victim, therefore abusing the
user’s session. This can lead the attacker into user’s sensitive information, and (if
it is a authenticated session) accessing any information the user has access to and
perform any action the user has permission for.
Bypassing Access Control. CORS makes it even simpler to access internal
websites from the internet. This can be seen as an improvement over CSRF (fifth
vulnerability in the OWASP Top 10 from chapter 2). With CORS, bypassing access
control is as simple as luring an internal employee to access a malicious website from
the internal network and, automatically, the attacker will be able to bypass the firewall
and access the internal network with a XHR.
Remote File Inclusion. RFI is an attack that leverages from pages dynamically
loaded by Ajax requests, having the response loaded into the HTML of the page. For
example, a page that loads the logout page based on the link:
http ://www. example .um. pt \\ index . j sp ? page=logout . j sp
Listing 3: RFI before CORS
The contents of the logout page would be fetched, added to the current page and
presented to the user. Until now, this vulnerability was limited by the Same Origin
Policy. With CORS, this attack gains a all new dimension allowing attackers to
perform actions like this:
http ://www. example .um. pt/ index . j sp ? page=http ://
www. from . attack . another . domain . com/home . j sp
Listing 4: RFI after CORS
The given code loads the attacker’s contents and embeds it in the vulnerable appli-
cation, running the code in the victim’s browser.
Cross site posting. This is an extension of the RFI presented above. In this
case, instead of using the attack to embed code into the page, the attacker tries to
redirect requests to his site and steal sensitive data. The response of the Ajax request
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will probably not be processed by the requesting site but the attack will still work.
Distributed Denial of Service Attack. By placing a link with malicious script
in a popular and secure website, and by luring a great number of users to click on
it, an attacker will be able to overload a server with XHR requests. If the number
of users clicking the link is big enough, it will be successfully launched a distributed
denial of service attack against the website. This attack will be possible even with
the Allow-Origin header properly defined because the requests will still be sent and
processed.
Scanning internal networks. An attacker can exploit CORS ability to external
communication and determine if some domain name exists or not. Even if the victim
domain has the Allow-origin properly defined, this study will be possible by analyzing
the response time of the requests. This will be as simple as send the request to multiple
random domains and analyzing the response type and time.
Reverse Web Shells. CORS can be exploitable to set-up a browser equivalent of
a reverse shell. If an attacker is able to hijack the victim’s session using XSS, and in-
ject a malicious script, this script will start to communicate with the attacker’s server
using a XHR and the attacker will be able to browse through the victim’s affected ses-
sion. The big advantage when comparing it with session hijacking is that this attack
also works within applications not accessible directly for the attacker. Basically, the
attacker uses the user’s session and browser as a proxy. An open source tool named
”Shell of the Future”1 [Kuppan (2010)] was already released and implements this idea.
It would be interesting but it’s not possible, in the context of this work, to get
into all the security details about CORS. There are much more possible attack vectors
surrounding this feature, that would lead to an extensive analysis.
The better strategy to avoid having security issues with CORS, is to properly
define the list of authorized origins headers. But the browsers and the server-side
applications will also have a very important role in this feature safety, because a bug
in one of them compromising the origin headers, will be enough to be exploited into
an attack.
3.2.2 Web Storage
Prior to HTML5, the information stored natively by the browser was limited to
cookies. However, there have always been several ways for web applications to store
1Shell of the Future User Guide, 2013: ”http://www.andlabs.org/tools/sotf/sotf.html”
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data, either by using browser extensions (Webkit, Safari and Chrome have supported
storage before HTML5 appears) or third-party plug-ins (like Java, Flash, Silverlight,
Google Gears2, etc.).
With the inclusion of client-side storage in the HTML5 specification, web appli-
cations will be able to store data in the client’s browser and access it using simple
javascript. This aims to improve web applications performance, security and to give
the developer much more control over the stored data.
Client-side storage provides two different ways for storing data in the client’s
browser: Local Storage [West and Pulimood (2012), McArdle (2011b), Trivero (2008)]
and Database Storage [McArdle (2011b), Trivero (2008), Michael Schmidt (2011)].
Session storage allows a developer to store text values in a key/value structure
(which can be accessed by the key). The data expires when the browser tab is closed
and is not shared between multiple tabs of the same domain, thus preventing from
data leaking. With cookies, the data was shared by multiple windows of the same
domain, making it hard, for example, to have two different shopping carts in two
different tabs.
Much like Session Storage, Local storage only allows a developer to store text
values in a key/value structure. However, Local Storage is shared between multiple
tabs of the same domain and it’s only restricted by the Same Origin Policy. This
means that a local storage value it’s only accessible for it’s creator website, but it’s
the same within multiple tabs. Another difference in local storage is that a value
never expires, and it’s only deleted if explicitly deleted in code or if the user deletes
the browser data.
One key advantage over the use of cookies is that, in Web storage, values are not
sent to and from the server in every request, therefore reducing the network traffic
and improving efficiency. Another advantage is that it increases the storage space per
domain to 5MB (more, depending on the the browser’s implementation). Another,
but less evident difference over cookies is that a value stored in a web storage through
a HTTP connection can not be accessed within a HTTPS connection and vice-versa.
With cookies, this was allowed as long as both request were from the same domain.
Besides Web Storage, HTML5 introduces Database Storage which is very similar
to Google Gears, and allows a web application to store structured data on the client-
side using a SQLite database. This feature opens the door to the development of
very powerful applications. Like in Web Storage, it only allows the web application
to store strings, and the data is only accessible in the same domain.
2Google Gears online page: ”https://developers.google.com/gears/”
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Different paths in the same domain will have access to the same data. If the data
needs to be different for each path, the web storage must be avoided.
Since the storage is associated with the browser and not with the user, any other
user who may access the browser will have access to the stored data. As so, if the
data is sensitive, developers must, at least encode the data before storing it and
authenticate users before decoding it. Also, for session handling, it may be good to
keep using cookies mainly because of the expiration period.
Next, it’s a list of some security situations which can emerge from the use of
Web Storage [Michael Schmidt (2011); McArdle (2011a); OWASP (2013b); Kuppan
(2010); Ryck et al. (2011)]:
Session Hijacking and information stealing. If sensitive data is stored in
local storage, and the website has a XSS vulnerability all the data is compromised.
Therefore, if session credentials are stored in local storage the user becomes vulnerable
to session hijacking. There is a method in local storage specification that makes
stealing information even easier. With the key(i) method, an attacker can easily get
all the local storage keys, and therefore get all the data stored.
User tracking. User tracking is already a reality using cookies. But this attack
can be greatly enhanced with the use of local storage. User tracking consist and track
the user through multiples sites and multiple sessions. Local storage never expires,
and so can be used to store a very long history of user’s actions. Local storage only
stores strings, but this problem can be overcomed with a simple string concatenation.
Vulnerable to malware. A web application might be totally secure and free of
any kind of vulnerabilities. But if the user’s machine is compromised by a malware,
it will be able to scan the browser’s data stored in the disk.
Stored XSS attacks. If the web application load data or code from local storage
without proper sanitization, local storage could also become a powerfull tool to inject
malicious scripts into web applications and perform Cross-Site Script attacks.
Client-Side SQL Injection. SQL Injection have always been considered a
server-side problem, but already with Google Gears, it became also a client-side
problem. Like, in server-side SQL Injection this problem happens when parametrized
queries are not used.
Local resource exhausting. WebSQL databases are restricted to 5MB in size.
When an application tries to store more than 5MB some browsers ask user for per-
mission but another ones simply don’t care. This can be used by an attacker to fill
the victim’s hard disk with spam.
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DNS spoofing/cache poisoning. This is a well know vulnerability one cannot
assume that a host who claims to belong to a certain domain, really is from that
domain. As so, TLS must be used.
3.2.3 Oﬄine Web Application
Another feature introduced by HTML5 it’s called Oﬄine Web Application. This
feature works with the use of an application cache designed to enable oﬄine web
browsing.
Any site can create oﬄine versions of itself in the browser cache, by defining a set
of files which are needed for the application to work oﬄine. To do this, the developer
must add to a manifest file a list of resources (CSS, HTML, JS, etc). This manifest
file will be parsed by the browser, which will download and keep updated all the
resources listed. Next time the user tries to access the website without an Internet
connection, the browser automatically swaps to the local copy.
The manifest file can be named and located anywhere on the server. Then, it
must be added to the attribute manifest in the html tag:
<html mani f e s t=”/cache . mani f e s t”>
Listing 5: Manifest attribute
In the HTML5 specification there are no major security implementation details about
this feature. However, it is stated that end users must be advised to clear the browser’s
cache every time they access the Internet from an insecure network. Also, end users
must be warned to only accept oﬄine caching from trusted websites.
Some possible security problems introduced by this feature are now described
[Michael Schmidt (2011); McArdle (2011a); OWASP (2013b); Kuppan (2010); Ryck
et al. (2011)]:
Cache poisoning. Cache poisoning attacks was already a threat before HTML5,
but now it gains even more relevance. By poisoning the browser’s cache, an attacker
can inject scripts and have them alive for longer durations. The scripts can be used
to perform tasks like steal user’s credentials or even to keep an eye on a particular
domain.
User tracking. The data stored in the Oﬄine Web Application cache stays
on the client’s browser until the server sends an update or the user deletes the cache
manually. As with Web Storage, the data stored oﬄine can be used for user tracking.
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3.2.4 Web Messaging
In HTML4, documents in different domains are not allowed to interact with each
other. This impose a huge limitation over those applications composed from multiple
embedded webpages and (more recently) javascript widgets. Until now, developers
are used to have two main methods to integrate external resources: using iframes or
inline javascript.
Using iframes (mainly used in the inclusion of embedded webpages) is secure,
but the contents loaded inside the iframe are isolated from the context of the main
application and cannot access the DOM.
With inline javascript (mainly used in the integration of javascript widgets), the
code is directly included into the main page and have complete access to the context
and the DOM. This is very useful but introduces serious security issues.
HTML5 specification introduces Cross Document Messaging, which allows the
communication between pages from different domains, in a way designed to prevent
cross-site scripting attacks. With this feature, it will be possible to include external
resources into embedded iframes and the iframes will be able to communicate with
each other and with the embedding web application.
Web messaging also integrates another way of communication called Channel Mes-
saging, which enables independent pieces of code, even if running in different contexts,
to communicate directly. The communication is implemented as two-ways pipes, with
a port on each end and messages delivered asynchronously as DOM events.
In terms of security, integrating external resources with web messaging it’s a big se-
curity improvement. However, it can also introduce security risks if not implemented
with caution. Some possible security threats are now presented [Michael Schmidt
(2011); McArdle (2011a); OWASP (2013b); Kuppan (2010); Ryck et al. (2011)]:
Injection of malicious scripts. Attackers can leverage from the communication
between documents, to send malicious content or steal sensitive data. Developers
must always check the origin of the message, ensuring that the message is from the
domain which it is supposed to be. Also, even with a proper checking of the origin
attribute, developers must validate the message and ensure that the data received is
in the format is supposed to. Finally, the data received must never be used directly
as innerHTML or passed into the javascript function ”eval()”.
Disclosure of sensitive data. In the most trivial flaw, we will see developers
using the ”*” in the Target attribute of messages with sensitive information. By using
”*”, there is no guarantee that the message will be delivered only to the intended
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recipient. This can lead to situations where the message is delivered to the wrong
recipient, disclosing sensitive data.
Denial of Service Attacks. Developers who accept messages from any origin
may be vulnerable to a denial-of-service attack. As it accepts messages from any
domain, an attacker may be able to send a high volume of messages per minute, lead-
ing to expensive computations and network traffic. HTML5 specification encouraged
developers to employ rate limiting (only accepting a certain number of messages per
minute) to avoid such attacks.
3.2.5 Web Sockets
Web Sockets is an API which allows a bidirectional, full-duplex communication
over a TCP socket. TCP Sockets are already known and very used in the IT world,
and are now being applied to the Client/Server communication in a web application.
Like CORS, Web Sockets connections can be established across domains.
Web Sockets will win special relevance in the development of real-time interactive
applications like chats, games, etc. Before Web Sockets, AJAX pooling mechanisms
were used to simulate a TCP connection, but have been proved as an inefficient
solution.
However, Web Sockets API doesn’t handle authentication and authorization. If
sensitive data are to be transfered, authentication and authorization must be handled
by the application. Also, in every packaged transfered, origin and destination must
be confirmed, and the contents of the packaged must be validated to avoid malicious
inputs. Furthermore, Web Sockets over SSH (wss://) must always be used to encrypt
the messages. If not, (”ws://”) messages will be transfered in plain text and a Men-
In-The-Middle attack will lead to the disclosure of the data.
Like any other feature, Web Sockets can introduce security problems [Michael Schmidt
(2011); McArdle (2011a); OWASP (2013b); Kuppan (2010); Ryck et al. (2011)]:
Port Scanning. Web Sockets can be used for port scanning of internal networks.
An attacker can have a malicious page, which the only goal is to open sockets and do a
port scanning on internal IP addresses. If the scanning results in an interesting open
port on the internal network, a tunnel can be established with the victim’s browser.
The attacker will, then, be able to bypass the firewall and access the internal network.
And all the victim did was accessing the attacker’s malicious webpage.
Access the connection. In applications using Web Sockets, XSS vulnerabilities
gain even more relevance, as the attacker will have access to the existing connections
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and will even be able to create new ones. By accessing an existing connection in the
victim’s page, an attacker will have the same permissions the user have over that
connection. So, he will be allowed to perform actions like log all the messages sent
and received by the victim, send messages in behalf of the victim, etc.
Remote Shell. Another possible scenario is the attacker to create a remote Shell.
If an application is vulnerable to XSS attacks, and if the attacker is able to gain access
to the victim’s page, he will be able to establish a Web Socket connection. Then,
he can use that connection to execute any JavaScript he wants on the victim’s page.
The connection will stay open until the victim close the browser page.
Distributed Denial of Service Attack. Like in CORS, an attacker can use the
victim’s vulnerable page to perform distributed denial of service attacks. By placing
a link with malicious script in a popular and secure website, and by luring a great
number of users to click on it, an attacker will be able to overload a server with Web
Socket connections and requests.
3.2.6 New Tags
HTML5 will support new elements and attributes. This expands the attack sur-
face for code injection attacks. Every new tag which allows Javascript execution,
represents a new possible attack vector for XSS and CSRF. Even applications which
are not vulnerable to Javascript, may become vulnerable because existing XSS filters
may fail against new and unknown tags.
Exploiting autofocus. In HTML5, a new ”autofocus” attribute is introduced,
which allows an element to be automatically focused. Before HTML5, injected
javascript will be placed in event handlers like ”onmouseover” or ”onclick”, which
requires the user interaction to be triggered. With this new attribute, the javascript
can be placed in the ”onfocus” event handler, and by also setting the ”autofocus”
attribute, the script will be triggered automatically, without the need of any user
interaction. This makes it much easier to execute injected scripts.
Form tampering. HTML5 also adds new attributes to the submit button,
which overrides the attribute values defined in the form. New attributes are ”for-
maction”, ”formenctype”, ”formmethod”, ”formnovalidate” and ”formtarget”. Also,
a new ”form” attribute is available to specify the form that an element belongs to.
Now, one element can be outside of the ”form” node and still belong to that form, if
indicated with the attribute ”form”.
So, if a page is vulnerable to a XSS attack, an attacker will be able to alter how
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the forms on that page behave. Due to the newly-provided capability to introduce
elements outside a form and override form properties, the attacker will just need to
introduce a new submit button in the page and use the new attributes to redefine the
form behavior. Also, the button can be placed anywhere in the page and associated
with the desired form with the ”form” attribute. So, if the attacker can lure the
victim into click in the new submit button, he will successfully be able to steal the
form information, by submitting the data into a destination of his choice.
3.2.7 Web Workers
The main goal of web Workers is to run background JavaScript so that long
tasks can be executed without making the page slower or unresponsive. Currently,
JavaScript has one big limitation: all its execution it’s done in one thread. Workers
overcome this limitation, by allowing the developer to create multiple JavaScript
threads that will run independently from each other. This will allow powerful scripts
to be executed in the user computer without him noticing it and will be very useful
when it comes to resource-intensive applications.
Workers don’t have access to the DOM of the calling page, and all the commu-
nication must be done by message passing. Workers are also allowed to use XHR to
perform in-domain and CORS requests. In the specification is stated that, generally,
workers are expected to be long-lived, have a high start-up performance cost, and a
high per-instance memory cost.
Web workers may not introduce security vulnerabilities directly, but they can in-
troduce a way of an attacker run code in background without the user notice it. This
is danger and can introduce situations like this [Michael Schmidt (2011); McArdle
(2011a); OWASP (2013b); Kuppan (2010); Ryck et al. (2011)]:
Spamming. Although workers do not have access to the DOM, they still can
be used to perform XHR requests and consuming CPU and memory resources. As
so, they can be used to spam and overload the user browser and computer. It’s very
important not to create Workers directly from user supplied input. However, if the
application is vulnerable to XSS attacks, an attacker may still be able to have Workers
executed in the user browser.
Distributed Denial of Service. It was already described in CORS and Web
Workers definitions, the possibility of achieving a DDoS attack. However, with Work-
ers this attack wins a all new dimension. A Worker can be executing in a user com-
puter, sending thousands of XHR requests per second and the user may not even
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notice. In [Michael Schmidt (2011)] is stated that, by combining CORS and Work-
ers is possible to send, with only one browser, about 10000 requests per second to a
server.
If an attacker can lure a great number of users all over the world to invoke the
malicious script, and with each user performing 10000 requests per second, this would
represent a huge server overload.
Distributed Brute Force Attack. Brute force attacks requires a lot of CPU
processing to be performed. Much like in the DDoS attack described above, an
attacker can lure a great number of users to invoke a malicious script and use Workers
in the victims browsers to distribute the CPU load.
Web Workers and Web Messaging. All the messages exchanged with the
Worker have to be validated and escaped in order to avoid XSS vulnerabilities. Also,
the messages received must never be used directly as innerHTML or passed into the
javascript function ”eval()”.
Furthermore, if an application already has XSS vulnerabilities, an attacker may
be able to inject a stealth Worker which will allow the attacker to monitor changes
in a particular DOM. Despite the worker inability to access the DOM, the attacker
can use event listeners to send informations to the worker.
3.2.8 Sandbox
HTML5 introduces a ”sandbox” attribute on iframes. By defining the sandbox
attribute, the following resources are disabled: plugins, forms, scripts, links to other
browsing contexts and the same-origin treatment of the content hosted by the iframe
and the content which hosts the iframe.
However, these restrictions can be relaxed and certain features can be re-enabled
by defining sandbox attribute value: allow-forms (re-enables forms), allow-scripts (re-
enables scripts), allow-top-navigation (re-enables links), allow-same-origin (re-enables
same-origin treatment).
This feature as already introduced one security vulnerability:
Bypass javascript security. Web framing attacks such as clickjacking use
iframes to hijack a user’s web session. The most used defense method, is called
frame busting, and prevents a site from functioning when loaded inside an frame.
The original version of frame busting can be easily bypassed using sandbox. Set-
ting the sandbox attribute disables JavaScript within the iframe and since the frame
busting relies on Javascript, it will not have the desired effect.
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Very recently, an update over the original frame busting method was released that
prevents this to happen. However, a big number of developers may not be aware of the
need to update their code, leave a great number of applications in risk of clickjacking
attacks.
3.2.9 Drag and Drop
This feature allows the user to drag and drop content between pages in the browser,
from the browser to the computer or from the computer to the browser.
Drag and Drop operations dealing with sensitive data must be dealt with extreme
caution. For example, developers must only consider a drop to be successful if the
user specifically ended the drag operation. In any other situation the operation must
be canceled and the drop must not be completed, therefore not compromising the
data.
Text-field injection. Drad and Drop feature can be used to inject contents into
an application simply by luring the victim to perform a Drag and Drop action. If the
application does not ensures that only safe content is dragged, malicious scripts can
be dropped into the victim page, therefore performing a XSS attack. This is not new,
it just introduces a new way of luring victims, as the attackers can even camouflage
the attack as a game that requires the player to drag and drop items.
3.2.10 Geolocation
The Geolocation API provides a high-level interface to get the user’s physical
location based on the GPS coordinates, latitude and longitude. As other features,
before Geolocation, getting the users position was only possible with external plug-ins.
Geolocation uses different sources to get the coordinates (e.g. GPS, WiFi and
mobile phone networks, IP address, used configured location) and different sources
mean different accuracies and response times, but they all get the job done.
Geolocation can raise privacy issues. The application always has to ask the user
for permission before accessing his location information (however, if this decision is
remembered or not, depends on the browser implementation). This may seem a good
security policy, but, this kind of security measure is not always as efficient as it should
be. Users not always understand the security risks and can be lured into accept the
request. As so, is very important to make users aware of the risks and advise them
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to only share their location to trusted service providers.
Possible threats introduced by the Geolocation feature will include [Michael Schmidt
(2011); McArdle (2011a); OWASP (2013b); Kuppan (2010); Ryck et al. (2011)]:
Tracking victims. Once the attacker gets the user permission, it has access to
the user’s current location. Also, the attacker can keep record of the various accesses
to the application and track the user movements in real-time.
Disclosure of Personal Information. With some precision, the location infor-
mation can be used to identify the user’s home address, places that he often visits,
etc. This kind of information opens a all new range of attack vectors outside of the
computer world.
Breaking Anonymity. If malicious web applications share the location infor-
mation of their users, this information can be used to identify users between multiple
domains. If the user is registered in one of the applications, the user’s location infor-
mation can be used to identify the same user in another application. Of course, this
will not have 100% of efficiency because information may not be accurate enough or
because there may be multiple users with similar locations. However, this is still a
valid threat which can compromise the anonymity of the user.
3.3 Summary
During this chapter, each one of the new HTML5 features were described. A good
conclusion comes out of this chapter: HTML5 was, from the beginning, designed
with security in consideration. However, if the developer doesn’t follow the security
considerations presented in the specification, HTML5 can introduce some new and
dangerous attacking vectors.
HTML5 will give the attackers some new ways of attack, which can be a useful
weapon for exploiting already vulnerable web applications. However, HTML5 will
not compromise secure web applications, and there is no need to redefine strategies
for the existing web applications.
One of the goals of this dissertation was to study the new features of HTML5, and
understand if they can introduce new security vulnerabilities. In general, HTML5 will
not introduce new vulnerabilities. However, it will boost some of the existing ones,
mainly Cross-Site Scripting. This comes from the inevitable consequence of bringing
more data and operations from the server to the client side.
At this point, it were already studied the vulnerabilities present in web applica-
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tions, and the consequences of integrating the new HTML5. In the next chapter, it
will approached another goal for this dissertation: study the process of building a




Manually reviewing the security of a web application is a long and complex process.
In fact, a complete manual review over a modern web application can be a very time-
consuming and expensive process. Therefore, automated tools are more and more
used. There are tools designed only to help the analyst in his review, while others
are designed to be more independent and to perform full analysis, generating reports
for the analyst to work upon.
Automated approaches can be further classified into two main categories: static
analysis or dynamic runtime approaches. In this chapter these two categories will
be described in an attempt to clearly differentiate them and highlight their pros and
cons.
Then, it will be studied the process of building a static analysis tool, addressing
all the stages of development, as the strategies and data structures needed during the
process. Dynamic tools will not be addressed here, as they fall out of the context of
this work.
Finally, a small set of open source static analysis tools will be studied, describing
their strategies, advantages and limitations. Not all of the tools described target
security, but they all fit into the profile of interest in the context of this work.
4.1 Reviewing security
4.1.1 Dynamic Runtime Approaches
Web applications are constantly changing, the source code is not always avail-
able, and new changes can represent new security vulnerabilities. In these situations,
dynamic approaches are very useful because they detect flaws while executing the
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audited application, after deploy and without the need for the source code.
A vulnerability detected by a dynamic tool, normally means that the tool was able
to successfully prove the existence of that vulnerability, leading to less false positives
and more reliable results. This reduces the human time needed to review the results.
Another advantage of dynamic approaches is that they are not language-dependent.
Many dynamic strategies and mechanisms are independent from the language, and
can be applied against any application.
However, automated approaches can also give a false sense of security that all vul-
nerabilities were found and that everything is tested, while that is not true. Dynamic
approaches don’t test all the possible execution paths, only static analysis approaches
can do that. Instead, only the paths invoked during the execution are tested. Also,
it’s more difficult to trace the vulnerability back to the exact location in the code,
taking longer to fix the problem.
4.1.2 Static Analysis Approaches
Static analysis (also referred as code analysis) has been a topic of strong research
for more than 30 years [Chess and West (2007); Pistoia et al. (2007); Dagenais and
Hendren (2008)] and is still actual.
Static analysis can give developers precise and detailed information about their
entire application. Any tool which analyzes code without executing it, is performing
static analysis. Also, static analysis may not always be made over the source code.
There are tools which perform the analysis over different compilation levels. In Java,
for example, there are many tools which perform the analysis over bytecode. A good
example is FindBugs [Ayewah et al. (2008)], presented later in this chapter.
In the scope of this work, static analysis will be approached as a method to perform
security analysis over software applications.
Security is sometimes overlooked in the software development lifecycle. This is
a huge error, developers should have well defined strategies and methodologies to
approach security. Developers need to examine and review the source code, multiple
times, to identify possible security flaws. Thats when static analysis tools step in.
Static analysis tools are helpful during multiple stages of the software development
lifecycle. This is a great advantage over dynamic approaches, allowing flaws to be
found earlier and therefore, reducing the effort and the costs to fix it.
When compared against runtime approaches, static analysis tools find more flaws
and have no runtime performance overhead because they are done before deploy.
However, they produce more false positives which reinforces the need for a human
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component. All reported errors must be manually examined in order to identify
possible false positives and find the true vulnerabilities in the code.
Another advantage of static analysis is that results can point out to the exact
location where the problem was detected, therefore simplifying the process of solving
it. Also, static analysis are capable of examining all the possible execution paths
in a program, and not just those invoked during execution. This means that static
analysis tools may find vulnerabilities that runtime testing tools won’t.
Static analysis tools have been in constant changing in the last decade, and have
evolved to became more efficient and more capable. In [Lopes et al. (2009)], the
first static analysis tools are described as ”difficult to use, tedious, and limited in
their ability to find real bugs (they could only find a list of functions known to be
dangerous)”, while more recent tools are described as capable of ”parse almost all the
languages for many common coding problems within different categories, including
complex error patterns”. The authors of [Lopes et al. (2009)] justify this evolution
with the complex techniques which have been added to static analysis tools over the
time (giving as an example metrics analysis, context analysis, semantic analysis and
the use of metadata to define rules and inner-function dependencies).
When testing such tools, the evolution becomes evident. The tool Lint was the
original static code analyzer of C code, and represents the ground zero of static
analyzers. There are, still, tools based on Lint, usually known as Lint-based. Are
examples of lint-based tools: PC-lint1, FlexeLint 2, JSHint3 or Splint4.
There are a big number of static code analysis tools available today, ranging from
the most trivial syntax parsers to more complex tools combining multiple methods
and strategies. Later in this chapter, it will be described and compared a series of
static analysis tools.
4.1.3 Hybrid approaches
Theoretically, an application security review should be a two-step process where
the application is submitted through independent code analysis and runtime tests.
Thus, static analysis can be used to find earlier vulnerabilities and fix them before
deploy the application. More ahead, runtime tests can be made to confirm the static
analysis results, and to make the tests even after the application goes into production.
1PC-lint online page, 2013: ”http://www.gimpel.com/html/pcl.htm”
2FlexeLint online page, 2013: ”http://www.gimpel.com/html/flex.htm”
3JSHint online page, 2013: ”http://www.jshint.com/”
4Splint online page, 2013: ”http://www.splint.org/”
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JNuke [Artho and Biere (2005)] is a great example of a hybrid solution. JNuke is
a framework for fault detection, which combines static and dynamic analysis. There
are two main advantages with this approach: static results can be applied in runtime
validation for verification and, by using static information, the runtime overhead it’s
reduced.
JNuke is presented by its authors as follows: ”By using a graph-free analysis, static
analysis remains close enough to program execution such that the algorithmic part
can be re-used for dynamic analysis. The environment encapsulates the differences
between these two scenarios, making evaluation of the generic algorithm completely
transparent to its environment. This way, the entire analysis logics and data struc-
tures can be re-used, allowing for comparing the two technologies with respect to
precision and efficiency”.
DyTa [Ge et al. (2011)] it’s another project that combines both static verification
and dynamic test generation. Again, the strategy is running dynamic tests over static
results to improve efficiency. DyTa is presented by its authors as follows: ”The static
phase detects potential defects with a static checker; the dynamic phase generates test
inputs through dynamic symbolic execution to confirm these potential defects. DyTa
reduces the number of false positives compared to static verification and performs
more efficiently compared to dynamic test generation”.
DyTa and JNuke are two examples, from a big range of academic and non-
academic studies, of combining static and dynamic approaches. But again, the focus
of this work will be in the static analysis perspective.
4.2 Building a Static Analysis Tool
Static analysis tools play an essential role in the security of web applications,
helping both developers and security reviewers. Developers can use them, during the
development stage, to fix bugs and security flaws as the application is being built.
Security reviewers can use them as a tool of assistant to find possible flaws and then,
manually analyze each possible flaw and evaluate if it is significant or not.
The process of building static analysis tools inherits a lot from the compilers world
[Aho et al. (1986)]. In fact, all static analysis tools have a similar way of working. As
we can see of Figure 4.1, at a very high level, they all receive source code files, build
a series of Intermediate Representation (IR) models and perform the analysis on top
of those models. The output of the program reflects the results of the analysis made.
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Figure 4.1: High level model of a static analysis tool.
Next, each of the stages from Figure 4.1 will be described in more detail.
4.2.1 Source code
The main advantage of a static analysis tool is the fact that it’s executed prior
to deploy. So, the analysis is applied over the source code of the application. Some
applications support multiple languages, while others are more specific and target
only one language. In fact, there are some tools even more specific that target only
a specific context of the language.
By having access to the source code, static analysis tools are able to get a precise
intermediate representation of the code (IR) and find flaws in the application that
are impossible to find with dynamic testing tools. But, in some situations, where
the source code is either not available or incomplete, it may be difficult to build a
complete and precise intermediate representation (IR) of the program.
To get around this, reverse engineer techniques can be applied. There are also
some static analysis related projects concentrated on reverse engineering incomplete
or compiled code, aiming to diminish the dependence of static analysis techniques
from the source code. A very good example is the framework described in [Dagenais
and Hendren (2008)] that, as described by the authors, is ”a framework that performs
partial type inference and uses heuristics to recover the declared type of expressions
and resolve ambiguities in partial Java programs”. The framework ”produces a com-
plete and typed IR suitable for further static analysis”.
This is very interesting because, in situations where the source code is compiled
or incomplete, frameworks like this can recover important contents of the application,
making it suitable for static analysis. These kind of reverse engineering techniques,
even if related to static analysis, represent a broad and completely different subject,
that will not be further studied as it falls out of the context of this work.
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4.2.2 Building models
Assuming the source code is already available, the first step when performing static
analysis is to transform the source code into one ore more intermediate representation
(IR) models. In the particular case of developing a tool targeting security, these IR
models are normally the following:
• Abstract syntax tree (AST)
• Control flow graph (CFG)
• Call graph (CG)
In essence, building these IRs structures is abstracting particular aspects of the
application sinto a set of models suited for analysis.
The following example, from [Chess and West (2007)], shows the process of build-
ing an AST and was developed with the ANTLR tool, ANother Tool for Language
Recognition [Parr (2007)].
Building an AST, starts with a lexical analysis [Aho et al. (1986)], transforming
the source code into a series of tokens. These tokens are identified by a series of rules,
normally based on regular expressions.
Taking the following example:
i f ( x==1)
y = y + 1 ;
Listing 6: Code example.
And applying the following lexical rules:
IF : ’ i f ’ ;
OPEN PAR : ’ ( ’ ;
CLOSE PAR: ’ ) ’ ;
EQUAL : ’= ’ ;
SC : ’ ; ’ ;
COMP OP : ( ’==’ | ’> ’ | ’< ’ | ’ != ’ ) ;
SUM OP : ’+ ’ ;
TXT VALUE: ( ’” ’ ( ˜ ’ ” ’ ) ∗ ’ ” ’ | ’ \ ’ ’ ( ˜ ’ ” ’ ) ∗ ’ \ ’ ’ ) ;
INT VALUE: ( ’ 0 ’ . . ’ 9 ’ ) +;
NAME : ( ’ a ’ . . ’ z ’ | ’A’ . . ’ Z ’ ) ( ’ a ’ . . ’ z ’ | ’A’ . . ’ Z ’ | ’ 0 ’ . . ’ 9 ’ ) ∗ ;
WS : ( ’ ’ | ’\n ’ | ’\ t ’ | ’\ r ’ )+ { $channel=HIDDEN; } ;
Listing 7: Example of lexical rules.
46
CHAPTER IV. STATIC ANALYSIS: BACKGROUND
Then, as a result we will have the following sequence of tokens:
IF OPEN PAR NAME COMP OP INT VALUE CLOSE PAR NAME EQUAL NAME SUM OP
INT VALUE;
Listing 8: Resultant sequence of tokens.
On a side note, there are some simple security tools which doesn’t need to go any
further. These tools work by looking for the names of dangerous functions (known to
be responsible to introduce vulnerabilities) in the sequence of tokens. If the function
is invoked, a warning is issued. Example of known tools which use this approach are
ITS41 or Flawfinder2.
Continuing with the example, the next step is to match the sequence of tokens
against a set of production rules which describes a context-free-grammar (CFG). This
is the parsing stage:
code : i f c o n d | as s i gn s tmt ;
i f c o n d : IF OPEN PAR comp CLOSE PAR code ;
a s s i gn s tmt : var EQUAL expr1 SC ;
comp : expr1 COMP OP expr1 ;
expr1 : sum oper | var | value ;
expr2 : var | value ;
sum oper : expr2 SUM OP expr2 ;
var : NAME;
value : INT VALUE | TXT VALUE;
Listing 9: Example of a grammar language.
By matching the sequence of tokens against the production rules, the parser will
be able to derive the parse tree (or concrete syntax tree) shown in Figure 4.2 (for
simplicity reasons, symbols that do not carry names were removed). The parse tree
is a data structure which contains the most direct representation of the code, exactly
as the programmer wrote it. Performing analysis over a parse tree is very inefficient,
as it contains symbols that exists only for the purpose of making the parsing stage
easier and non-ambiguous. So, the static analysis is not performed over one parse
tree, but over one Abstract Syntax Tree (AST).
One AST provides a more general and standardized version of the program, remov-
ing all the symbols not needed for analysis. The AST is normally built by associating
tree construction code with the more generic grammars production rules.
The AST for the example in study is shown on Figure 4.3.
1ITS4 online page, 2013: ”http://www.cigital.com/its4/”
2Flawfinder online page, 2013: ”http://www.dwheeler.com/flawfinder/
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Figure 4.2: Parse tree generated in the example.
In this stage, along with the AST, it’s performed the so called semantic analysis.
Semantic analysis it’s where are given meaning to the symbols found in the program.
Are examples of semantic analysis: symbol resolution (building a symbol table which
maps each identifier with the information related to its declaration or definition),
type checking (checking for type errors), object binding (associating variables and
functions with their definitions), definite assignment (requiring all local variables to
be initialized before use), etc.
Until the AST construction, the process is the same for both compilers and static
analysis tools (including the ones which that target security). However, in semantic
analysis, each solution may have its own implementation. Semantic analysis depends
directly from the purpose of the application, and different static analysis tools require
different semantic analysis techniques. There are, in fact, tools which don’t need to
go any further, as semantic analysis is the type of analysis they are looking for (this
is not the case on most of the security analysis).
At this point, and based on the AST already available, multiple options of analysis
are available. As stated before, the AST provides a standardized version of the
program, and it will be the basis for all the analysis made. There are multiple analysis
techniques, ranging from the most primitive to the more complex and sophisticated.
In fact, there are so many academics and non-academics studies, tools and prototypes
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Figure 4.3: Abstract syntax tree for the example.
that it would be impossible to cover them all in one document.
There are two main techniques which can be highlighted, as they fit better into
the purpose of this work:
• Pattern Based Analysis
• Data Flow Analysis
4.2.2.1 Pattern Based Analysis
Pattern based analysis is the process of parsing the source code looking for pat-
terns. To security purposes, these patterns normally represent pieces of code known
to introduce security vulnerabilities.
Pattern Based Analysis is a flow-insensitive technique, and is seen more as a
solution for prevention instead of detection. It’s commonly used, for example, in
IDEs and syntax checkers. However, this does not mean that pattern based analysis
don’t fit into security analysis. It is very useful to build systems with analysis oriented
by security rules (or patterns).
A static analysis tool, sometimes provides the user with the option of building
their own custom security rules. Pattern based analysis it’s also very useful in these
situations.
Pattern based analysis can be performed in multiple stages and over different IR
data structures. It can be done over the series of tokens generated in the lexical
analysis. It can also be done over the parse tree or the abstract syntax tree. More
rudimentary solutions can even be done over the source code.
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4.2.2.2 Data flow analysis
A major challenge associated with web applications is that their most critical
vulnerabilities are often the result of insecure information flow. The fact is, analyzing
how data propagates throw an application is the only way to detect some type of
vulnerabilities.
Data flow analysis [Nilsson-Nyman et al. (2009); Khedker et al. (2009); Pistoia
et al. (2007); Chess and West (2007)] is the process of collecting information about
the use, definition and dependencies of data in programs. In [Pistoia et al. (2007)],
data flow analysis is described as ”a process for collecting run-time information about
data in programs without actually executing them. Data flow analysis however does
not make use of semantics of operators. The semantics of the program language
syntax is, however, implicit captured in the rules of the algorithms”.
The first step to perform data flow analysis, is to built a Control Flow Graph
(CFG) on top of the AST (and other IR models available). A CFG represent all the
possible execution paths of a program.
Each node in the graph represents a basic block, which is a sequence of consec-
utive instructions such that control flow enters the block in the beginning and only
leaves at the end, with all the instructions in the block executed. In other words, all
the instructions in the basic block must be executed and there is no possibility of any
instructions being skipped.
Directed edges are used to represent jumps in the control flow. If a block has no
incoming edge it is called an entry block, and if a block has no outgoing edge, it is
called an exit block. Back edges represent potential loops.
Data flow analysis is performed without (actually) executing the program. There-
fore is not possible to determine what will be the path (in the control flow graph)
that will be taken during the execution of the program. So, all the possible execution
paths are simulated. A good example is the if-then-else condition: as it is not possible
to know what branch of the condition the program will execute, both branches of the
statement will be considered to be actual execution paths.
A control flow path is a path in the control flow graph that starts at an entry
block (first instruction) and ends at an exit block (last instruction). The number of
control flow paths in a program can range from one (very uncommon, only seen in
the most basic programs) to infinite (because of the unpredictability of some loop
bounds). One major task of the worst case execution time analysis is to find the
longest possible control flow path.
The following example, from [Chess and West (2007)], is a very simple example
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of a control flow graph. The code fragment shows a simple if-then-else condition
followed with a return statement. The if branch has only one condition while the else
branch has two conditions.
To simplify the example, basic blocks show source code. In a static analysis tool,
this blocks don’t contain code but pointers to AST nodes (or other IR models used).
In the corresponding control flow graph, also shown in figure 4.4, it’s possible to see
that there are two possible control flow paths: [bb0, bb1, bb3] and [bb0, bb2, bb3].
Figure 4.4: Example of a simple control flow graph.
All methods presented so far are considered part of an intra-procedural analysis.
When bugs or vulnerabilities are limited to a function scope, an intra-procedural anal-
ysis is probably enough. But, when a more comprehensive analysis is needed, it may
require inter-procedural analysis techniques, normally seen only in more advanced
tools.
For this, at least one data structure is needed: a call graph, which represents
the possible interaction between functions and methods in an application. In a CG,
nodes represent functions and edges represent invocations between those functions.
Figure 4.5, from [Chess and West (2007)], shows a simple example of a call graph,
and the corresponding source code. The call graph can be easily read like:
• function larry can invoke moe or curly;
• function moe can invoke curly or moe again (recursively);
• function curly don’t invoke any functions.
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Figure 4.5: Example of a call graph.
At this point it was already explained what is Data Flow Analysis and what data
structures are needed to implement it. Of course, there are also a possibility of other
structures being needed, which can range from the most basic to more complex ones.
4.2.3 Perform Analysis
At this point, it’s important to understand what are the possible strategies and
algorithms which can be applied to approach data flow problems. Analysis algorithms
work over the data structures, combining and manipulating the data in order to get
the analysis information.
In this work, it will be approached three main algorithms used to perform data
flow analysis. These algorithms alone are sufficient to identify many data flow vul-
nerabilities and are the basis for many known tools and more advanced techniques:
• Single Statement Assessment;
• Taint Analysis;
• Pointer Analysis.
4.2.4 Single Statement Assessment
SSA consists on creating new variables every time a value is assigned to a variable.
This means that, in SSA, a variable can be assigned only once. In a simple case, where
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a variable (var) is assigned three times in a program, after applying SSA, the program
will refer to variables as var1, var2, var3.
This can be very useful to identify dataflow problems, as it becomes very easy to
understand from where a variable comes.
4.2.5 Taint Analysis
Taint analysis [Sridharan et al. (2011); Chess and West (2007); Nilsson-Nyman
et al. (2009)] is a technique which emerged from PERL, and many analysis have
appeared in the last few years as taint-based approaches [Mui and Frankl (2011);
Haldar et al. (2005); Sridharan et al. (2011)]. The goal in taint analysis is to detect
the flow of untrusted information into sensitive areas, which can compromise the
security of the application.
In [Sridharan et al. (2011)], Taint analysis is described as ”an information-flow
analysis that automatically detects flows of untrusted data into security-sensitive
computations (integrity violations) or flows of private data into computations that
expose information to public observers”.
The first step to understand taint analysis is defining its terminology: A tainted
object propagation problem consists of a set of source, sink and derivation descriptors.
• Source descriptors specify ways in which user-provided data can enter the
program.
• Sink descriptors specify unsafe places where data may be used in the program.
• Derivation descriptors specify how data propagates between objects in the
program.
Is considered tainted, all data possibly coming from malicious input (sources), not
properly escaped, and capable of cause security flaws in sensitive points of the program
(sinks). Functions which have the goal of escaping input are called sanitizers.
4.2.6 Pointer Analysis
Finding objects which a given variable or object field may point to it’s called
Pointer Analysis or Points-to Analysis. Pointer analysis is a well-known program
analysis, which provides information needed in data flow analysis.
There is a wide variety of points-to analyses, with different degrees of precision
and cost.
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Pointer analysis techniques are very useful and very important when performing
any kind of static analysis and security analysis are not an exception. Pointer analysis
is also a know and relatively well understood as a whole independent program analysis.
4.2.7 Generating reports
Reporting the results of an analysis have a major impact on the value of the tool.
As stated before, static analysis tools have the disadvantage of providing many
false positives. This reinforces the need for a human component, therefore increasing
the interaction of the user with the tool and reinforcing the need for decent reporting.
Many tools are available as IDE plugins. This is very useful because it can be
used the IDE interface to point possible errors directly in the code. Also, developers
are already familiarized with the IDE (and possible other plugins), therefore reducing
the period of adaptation.
Possible useful reporting features are: grouping, sorting and eliminating results;
classify problems by their severity or category; give a description for the problems and
provide possible solutions; show the history of analysis made over a web application.
As bigger the range of reporting features provided by the tool, the bigger is the
probability of the user correctly understanding the problems.
4.3 Open Source Tools
Different tools means different techniques, what usually leads to different results.
Particular techniques affect the output of a tool differently and the choice over differ-
ent techniques it’s dictated by the goals of the tool. Depending on the kind of flaws
which the tool is intended to find, different techniques may be required. A common
technique used by security experts, is to cross-check their reports from multiple tools.
There are even some tools like Yasca (described later in this chapter) which automates
this process by submitting the code through multiple analysis tools, consolidating the
results with well defined metrics and presenting a single report to the user.
Not all the tools described below were designed for security purposes, but they
are all useful to developers with security concerns. The study of these tools will be
focused on their extensibility to security purposes and in their ability to, within their
intended context, be useful in a security analysis.
As stated before, there are a big number of open source static analysis tools,
but not all of them are subject of study. In the context of this work, just some
of them are described next, being the choice made based on the tool’s architecture,
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methodologies and techniques. If a tool is here described, it’s because it can bring
important knowledge and concepts when building the architecture for a new static
analysis tool.
4.3.1 FindBugs
FindBugs [Ayewah et al. (2008)] is a bung finder tool which performs static anal-
ysis over Java bytecode. It works by looking for occurrences of bug patterns in the
bytecode. In the context of Open Source tools, FindBugs is the tool most recognized,
as it is very flexible and provides the best possibilities to write custom bug detectors.
By its nature, FindBugs is not a security tool. To use it as a security tool, one has
to use it out-of-the-box, and write custom security detectors. There are also some
security detectors which have been integrated over time and other available online
for download. However, build custom security detectors is not trivial and requires a
good understanding of FindBugs architecture, therefore requiring experience users.
Because it works over Java bytecode, FindBugs only requires compiled class files
to work. However, it allows the user to specify source files to see directly the related
suspicious code in the code. Operating over bytecode allows FindBugs, not only to
analyze the source code of the application, but also to analyze dependent libraries or
any other components previously compiled into bytecode.
FindBugs perform analyses using BCEL1. It also extends BCEL in order to pro-
vide data flow features. It allows data flow analysis over a control flow graph, and
already provides some data flow detectors (for example, for detecting SQL Injection
vulnerabilities).
So, FindBugs detectors can be as simple as a visitor pattern over class files, or be
more complex and use the control flow graph to perform data flow analysis.
FindBugs has also a very good organization, as each bug pattern belongs to a group
(correctness, bad practice, security, etc) and is assigned a priority (high, medium or
low). FindBugs is available as a standalone application or integrated into Java IDE’s,
including Eclipse and NetBeans.
4.3.2 TAJ
TAJ (Taint Analysis for Java)[Tripp et al. (2009)] is a tool which detects data
flow vulnerabilities using Taint Analysis.
1Apache BCEL online page, 2013: ”http://commons.apache.org/proper/commons-bcel/”
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TAJ is presented here mainly because of its scalability, improving analysis over
large applications. By its authors, is described as a tool ”designed to be precise enough
to produce a low false-positive rate, yet scalable enough to allow the analysis of large
applications. TAJ incorporates a number of techniques to produce useful results on
extremely large applications, even when constrained to a given time or memory bud-
get. Furthermore, TAJ supports many complex features of Java Platform, Enterprise
Edition (Java EE) Web applications”.
As any other taint analysis tool, TAJ works based on a set of sources, sanitizers
and sinks. It performs the analysis in two stages: first, it performs pointer analysis
and builds a call graph. Then, it runs a hybrid thin slicing algorithm to track tainted
data. This thin slicing algorithm is the core of TAJ. Thin slicing algorithms are very
useful in taint analysis as they allow to capture the statements most relevant to a
tainted flow.
That’s also the main reason why TAJ is presented here. Thin slicing is a very
solid and useful technique that has proven to be capable of improving static analysis
efficiency without compromising precision. Before TAJ, a set of context sensitive and
context insensitive thin slicing algorithms were used, but TAJ runs a hybrid slicing
algorithm in order to get a better trade-off between the number of false positives and
the scalability of the algorithm.
4.3.3 Pixy
Pixy [Jovanovic et al. (2010), Jovanovic et al. (2006)] is another good example
of an open source tool capable of detecting XSS vulnerabilities using taint analysis.
Although Pixy was developed to find vulnerabilities over PHP applications, the taint-
based data flow analysis is the basis for any efficient tool aiming to find vulnerabilities
as XSS or Injection.
Pixy is an open source tool for PHP analysis, but it was implemented in Java. It
is presented here because of its simplicity and efficiency in applying flow-sensitive and
inter-procedural data flow analysis to find security vulnerabilities. Pixy is also the
perfect example of the data structures and strategies presented in this chapter. It uses
Jflex1 to build the AST, generates the CFG and then applies a taint based data flow
analysis over those structures. However, it does not build the CG, as intra-procedural
analysis is no provided.
Pixy is explained by its developers as follows ”we use flow-sensitive, inter-procedural
and context-sensitive data flow analysis to discover vulnerable points in a program.
1Jflex online page, 2013: ”http://jflex.de/”
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In addition to the taint analysis at the core of our engine, we employ a precise alias
analysis targeted at the unique reference semantics commonly found in scripting lan-
guages. Moreover, we enhance the quality and quantity of the generated vulnerability
reports by employing an iterative two-phase algorithm for fast and precise resolution
of file inclusions”.
Although Pixy is presented and focused on XSS vulnerabilities, it can be easily
extended to find other data flow vulnerabilities like Injection.
4.3.4 F4F
Modern web applications are built using one or more development frameworks.
These frameworks simplify the work of a developer, by providing a higher level of
abstraction from some implementation details. However, they also represent diffi-
culties in static analysis. Open source tools, normally just ignore the fact that the
application is built upon such frameworks, significantly reducing the efficiency of the
analysis itself.
In the field of analysis over framework-based web applications, there is F4F
(Framework for frameworks) [Sridharan et al. (2011)]. There are some previous works
on this area but they all are mainly focused on some framework features, with an ad-
hoc perspective. F4F provides a more general solution, capable of handling multiple
frameworks, which becomes very important with the increasing number of frameworks
used today.
By its authors, F4F is described as a ”novel solution that augments taint analysis
engines with precise framework support and allows for handling new frameworks with-
out modifying the core analysis engine. In F4F, a framework analyzer first generates
a specification of an application’s framework-related behavior in a simple language
called WAFL. The taint analysis then uses the WAFL specification to enhance its
analysis of the application”.
F4F authors, identify the problem as the framework’s use of reflection to invoke
application code, based on information provided in the configuration files. This ex-
tensive use of reflection causes well known difficulties for static analysis. They also
identify that ”handling reflection via code analysis can also cause scalability prob-
lems, as excessively over-approximate reflection handling can lead to analysis of a
large amount of unreachable code.”
Besides reflection, F4F authors identify that complex string manipulation and
data structures usage in framework code can also cause static analysis difficulties.
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F4F works by generating a specification of the program’s framework related be-
haviors, called WAFL (Web Application Framework Language).
This is a great advantage, as new frameworks can be added without changing
the core analysis mechanisms. For each framework introduced, only a new WAFL
specification needs to be built. Then, that specification is used with the analysis
mechanisms and more precise results can be achieved when analyzing framework
based web applications.
In F4F, this methodology is used to improve taint analysis and a simple example
is built as proof of concept. However, it becomes perfectly clear, that this approach
can be easily extended to other static analysis strategies and even other fields of code
analysis.
4.3.5 PMD
PMD scans Java Source code, looking for errors that depends on programming
syntax. Typically, this errors are sign of bad programming. This kind of errors would
be very important when analyzing HTML5 applications. As evidenced before, bad
practices in HTML5 can lead to security vulnerabilities and, this syntax analysis,
would be very important to avoid those vulnerabilities.
PMD works with one abstract syntax tree built over the source code by a JavaCC
(Java Compiler Compiler)1 generated parser. The AST is based upon an XML
schema.
One of the goals of PMD is to make AST walker analysis easy to write. As so,
PMD allows the creation of custom rules both in Java or XPath expressions. As it
looks only for programming syntax errors, PMD is not very suitable for data flow
analysis, significantly reducing the utility of PMD in security analysis.
PMD has a lot of existing rules for many simple and specific situations, thus
making it suitable for small and specific analysis. However, it’s also very limited in
more complex analysis over complete Java EE applications. PMD is available as a
command line program or integrated into Java IDE’s, including Eclipse and NetBeans.
4.3.6 Yasca
The analysis made by Yasca2 is different from the analysis made by the set of
tools presented so far. However, it’s a very useful tool, as it’s capable of analyzing
1Java Compiler Compiler online page, 2013: ”http://javacc.java.net/”
2Yasca online page, 2013: ”http://www.scovetta.com/yasca.html”
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multiple languages (Java, PHP, ASP, C, C++) and it’s focused on both bug-finding
and security analysis. It’s described by the author as a ”glorified grep script plus an
aggregator of other open-source tools”.
Yasca uses external tools to perform the analysis and it’s presented here because
it is, probably, the most well known and recognized tool with such strategy. Tools like
Yasca are very useful because they are able to compile results from multiple tools and
show them them to the user in a single report, therefore reducing the effort needed
to review the results and, for example, identify false positives.
Yasca started as a set of perl scripts that grepped through source code looking for
XSS vulnerabilities. More recently, it became an OWASP tool3.
Its main characteristic is to be highly extensible, as it is built in a plugin-based
architecture. Originally, it contains a set of custom scanners built just for Yasca.
To perform analysis, the user can build it’s own rules or even integrate external
tools. The external tools mechanism, uses a set of external tools (for example, Find-
Bugs, PMD, JLint, Javascript Lint, PHPLint, Cppcheck, ClamAV, RATS or Pixy)
to perform the analysis.
4.3.7 PQL
PQL (Program Query Language) [Martin et al. (2005)] is another solution very
different from the set of tools presented so far.
PQL is not a tool, is a query language which allows users to express a large class
of application security patterns. Then, PQL system, based on those security pattern,
automatically generates a pair of static and dynamic checkers.
The static checker has the goal of finding all the potential matches of the pattern
in the code.
The dynamic checker has the goal of identifying errors precisely when they are
found (by the static checker) and enabling actions like logging, recovery or other user
specified actions.
In Figure 4.6, a simple PQL query from [Martin et al. (2005)] is shown. By analyz-
ing the query, it’s possible to easily understand that the query is named ”forceclose”,
looks for situations where InputStream objects are instantiated but not closed before
the end of the method (being this the static part). Then, if a situation occurs, a call
to close() is inserted automatically (being this is the dynamic part).
In [Martin et al. (2005)], PQL is implemented in a proof of concept tool and
used to perform analysis over six real world web applications. Also, there are some
3OWASP Yasca project, 2013: ”https://www.owasp.org/index.php/CategoryOWASP Yasca Project”
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literature and small solutions which explore PQL in the development of static analysis
tools.
Figure 4.6: Example of a PQL query.
4.4 Summary
This chapter completes another goal proposed for this dissertation: perform a
detailed analysis over static analysis tools, methodologies and strategies.
During this chapter, it was studied the main stages of the process of the developing
a static analysis tool targeting security. For each stage, it were described the most
important data structures needed and the strategies that must be used.
Then, this was consolidated with the analysis of a set of frameworks and open
source tools. The goal was to understand the work that already has been done in this
field, in order to better understand what can be accomplished in the future.
In the next chapter, based on the knowledge acquired from chapters 2 and 3, and
the understanding of static analysis tools acquired from this chapter, it will be defined
a set of guidelines and a high level platform for a static analysis tool.
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An Approach to Handle Static
Analysis
This chapter is where all the information presented so far is compiled together.
Basically, it will be answered questions like: What’s missing on open source static
analysis tools? Do the existing tools cover the main threats on web security today?
What can be added to the existing tools and methodologies? Are the today tools
and methodologies useful when dealing with HTML5 security? This chapter has
the main goal of putting the right questions and simultaneously providing possible
implementations and solutions. Then, those solutions will be compiled into the form
of a high-level approach for a platform capable of performing static analysis.
5.1 Basics
Modern web applications are multi-tier systems built with multiple languages and
technologies. Taking as an example, a simple JEE application is normally composed
with a data layer (normally SQL databases), a business Layer (the JEE part) and a
presentation layer (HTML, Javascript, etc). There are also the integration of external
libraries, communication with external systems (web services, for example), and many
other functionalities.
So, and taking into account all that has been said in the previous chapters, for an
application to be capable of parsing and analyzing the security of a web application, it
has to be built with consideration of the vulnerabilities that it targets. Vulnerabilities
are different and need different approaches to be found.
To find SQL injection vulnerabilities, for example, it’s necessary to follow and
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analyze the application data flow, in order to understand if malicious instructions are
able to get to the database and be executed as commands. On the other hand, to
detect security misconfiguration errors and bad practices, data flow analysis is not
needed and a simple pattern-based analysis is enough.
In chapter 3, HTML5 security was reviewed and possibly vulnerabilities were
discussed. The main conclusion from chapter 3 is that HTML5 will introduce two
different threat vectors. It will boost XSS vulnerabilities, as more information is
being used on client side, and it will introduce new possible attack vectors that can
lead to new vulnerabilities and to new ways of exploring old vulnerabilities.
So, reviewing the security of a web application built with HTML5, is a two step
process. First, it has to be ensured that the application has no XSS vulnerabilities.
If one application has XSS vulnerabilities, then almost every feature of HTML5 is
compromised. The second step is to ensure that the most critical features are properly
implemented. As stated before, HTML5 was developed with a great concern on
security (probably like any language before). Each feature has a chapter of security
considerations in the specification. If followed, those considerations will lead to secure
implementation of the features. On the other hand, poor implementation will almost
definitely lead to very serious problems.
The first step depends mainly a taint based data flow analysis, finding possible
sinks where input can get without being properly validate. In chapter, multiple tools
multiple capable of finding XSS vulnerabilities were presented and most of them used
taint based approaches.
The second step requires a pattern based analysis, looking for possible poor im-
plementations. Taking the most trivial and dangerous example, the CORS header
defined like this:
Access−Control−Allow−Orig in : ”∗”
Listing 10: Bad implementation of a CORS header
Finding this kind of errors is as simple as looking for in HTML pages for implemen-
tations like this one. The same happens with the poor integration of new tags and
attributes, and many other errors. The solution is to compile all security consid-
erations surrounding HTML5, transforming them into patterns and look for those
patterns in HTML pages.
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5.2 Features
After the analysis made over the open source static analysis tools, there were some
limitations that can be highlighted as the most common between all the tools.
Next, this limitations are presented as a list of features, that are not totally
integrated in the open source tools but which are very important to consider when
performing analysis over modern and complex web applications.
5.2.1 Security Patterns
Software design patterns are reusable solutions to commonly occurring problems
in the design of software applications. They take advantage of the experience and
knowledge acquired during the development of a specific solution. A design pattern
describes the solution, the problem and the problem in which it must be used.
The same concept of software design patterns, can also applied to the security of
web applications, as security design patterns. This is not new, there are multiple aca-
demic works in this field, for example [Dalai and Jena (2011)], where design patterns
are defined and put into use in terms of security.
Security design patterns are also the key to find HTML5 poor implementation
vulnerabilities. The tool to build must be able to receive a set of security design
patterns and find them in the code. An important work has also to be made in
defining the security patterns. HTML5 security considerations is a good place to
start. Each consideration is a candidate to be built as a security pattern. In the
perfect scenario, all security considerations identified in the specification, would have
the corresponding security pattern. But, of course this is not a reality as there are
security considerations to abstract and others to complex to integrate into patterns.
This is an approach very similar to PMD (tool presented in chapter 4). As it will be
shown below, PQL (also presented in chapter 4) can also be very useful in this kind
of analysis.
5.2.2 Context Sensitive
Generic code usually means generic flaws, common to multiple applications. These
kind of flaws can be found by applying the same analysis methods on all the appli-
cations. With the growing use of frameworks and design patterns, applications are
becoming more and more generic, and the amount of custom code per application is
significantly reducing.
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However, there are still a big number of applications built from scratch using
custom code. And, of course, there are still some features which need custom im-
plementations. In these situations, it may occur some flaws which are specific to
an application. These flaws are considered context-specific and usually require cus-
tomization over the analysis methods.
In [Chess and West (2007)], this situation is demonstrated with an example of
a program that handles credit card numbers. To comply with the payment card
industry data protection standard, a credit card number should never be completely
displayed back to the user. There is no standard implementation to this feature, and
so, different applications will have different implementations of it. Therefore, find
specific flaws in this situation, would require understanding specific functions and
data structures used in the application code.
Concluding, the approach to considerer when reviewing an application’s source
code, depends on whether they are generic or context specific. This is one of the
biggest challenges when building a static analysis tool. There are some scientific ap-
proaches to build more context-sensitive solutions, but the best solution to approach
specific situations is to allow the user to customize his own rules. In fact, in the open
source world, this solution is consensual between almost every tool.
This extends the approach previously made surrounding security patterns. If the
user is able to build their own patterns, and integrate them in the tool, the application
can grow with the users. A very good example is FindBugs. Many detectors available
for FindBugs today, are design by users and then suggested to the development team.
This allow the tool to grow with experience and to evolve as the methodologies evolve.
As so, not only the tool must let the user to build their own patterns, as also must
place the proper mechanisms for users to suggest new patterns into the core of the
tool.
There should also be noted that custom patterns does not compensate for tool
limitations. Custom patterns are restrained by the limitations of the tool. If a tool
doesn’t perform data flow analysis, then there no way of building custom patterns
capable of efficiently detecting vulnerabilities like XSS or Injection.
5.2.3 Modularity
There are more than 100 open-source tools and they all have different character-
istics and goals. Each one of them covers a set of vulnerabilities, but none of them
covers them all, as that would be almost impossible to achieve. Mainly because differ-
ent kind of vulnerabilities have different characteristics and need different strategies
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to be found.
Earlier in this document, it was already explained that are tools which try to fill
this gap, by aggregating a set of another tools, taking advantage of their different
strategies and methodologies. A good example is YASCA, presented in chapter 4.
Static analysis tools can then be divided into two categories: a tool which is built
specifically to a set of vulnerabilities, very efficient withins its goals, but unable to be
adapted and expanded. Or a tool capable of analyzing a wider set of vulnerabilities
but that is not so efficient in each one.
To achieve modularity, each component of the solution must be built to a specific
purpose, but must also be built in order to be extended. This thinking must be putted
in every component and in every consideration. Besides the fact that this work is
mainly focused on Java and HTML5, multi language analysis, communication services
and frameworks will be approached next. The goal is to design a modular tool capable
of growing as a whole and integrate new modules over time.
5.2.4 Multi Language Analysis
Multi language analysis can be seen in two different ways. First, the ability of the
tool to parse and analyze applications with different languages (for example, a Java
application and a .NET application). On the other hand, most of the modern web
applications are composed of multiple modules built upon various programming and
specification languages. As stated before, for example, even the most simple Java
web application may consist of SQL, Java, HTML and Javascript. This can also be
seen as multi language analysis, but, for simplicity purposes, it will be referred as
mixed language analysis.
In general, open source analysis tools cannot process these multiple or mixed
languages systems as a whole, because they are built to a particular language. At
best, they can process multiple languages, but do it individually, or by integrating
external tools.
The only way to perform analysis over applications which integrate multiple lan-
guages or consist of multiple heterogeneous processes, is to build common models.
Getting out of a the static analysis context, there are approaches specially designed
to abstract particular aspects of languages into common models. A good example
is [Strein et al. (2006)], where this problem is identified as ”the lack of a common
meta-model capturing program information for analysis and refactoring that is com-
mon for a set of programming languages abstracting from details of each individual
language, and that is related to the source code level of abstraction in order to allow
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for source-code analysis and refactoring”.
To approach this problem, in [Strein et al. (2006)], a common meta-model archi-
tecture is designed and applied into an IDE, built as proof of concept. The common
meta-model captures the information, and represent it in a language independent
structure. To build this representation, first, multiple specific front-ends build lan-
guage specific meta-models. Then, parts that are relevant are abstracted to a common
model.
In Figure 5.1, is presented the kernel architecture proposed in [Strein et al. (2006)].
The same concepts seen in Figure 5.1, can be applied to any application which an-
Figure 5.1: Kernel architecture, [Strein et al. (2006)].
alyzes code. The disadvantage of building common models is the lost of precision.
Sometimes is impossible to abstract some specificities into those models, or that will
lead to the lost of important information for the analysis.
In the world of proprietary tools, there are multiple applications who process
systems with multiple or mixed languages. However, in open source tools this is
not available yet. There are some tools starting to draft some concepts over mixed
language systems, but there isn’t a single open source tool who performs this as
proprietary tools do.
Drilling down on the architecture from Figure 5.1, the question is how can a
static analysis tool leverage from a system like this to perform multi-language static
analysis. There are multiple academic approaches to this, and many prototypes built
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as proof of concept, but the fact is that none of them is yet included in open source
tools.
In these systems, it becomes clear that there two type of IR models: language-
specific or common models. It’s hard to perform an efficient pattern based analysis
for Java vulnerabilities over the common models. This kind of analysis must to be
done over the specific models. But, an efficient tainted-based data flow analysis can
be applied just by identifying the source, sink and derivation descriptors to track the
information flow and so, it can be made over the common models ans still present
reliable results.
A language is no more that a grammar applied into work. As so, by having access
to the language grammar, as explained in chapter 4, it’s possible to parse the code
into a series of models. The process is the same for different languages. These models
can then be abstracted to common models, and the analysis made over models. In the
case of an inter and intra procedural-data flow analysis, these models are the AST,
the CFG and the CG.
Of course this is only possible in similar languages like Java and .NET. It’s not
possible to build common models between HTML5 ad Java, because the languages
have to be semantically alike.
This answer the question of how to build an application not restricted to a partic-
ular language. But, systems like the one presented in Figure 5.1, have the limitation
of being unable to perform analysis in systems with mixed-language analysis.
Taking as example Javascript, which has very similarities with Java. The exact
same process used to parse a Java program, and build the IR models, can be used
to build the models in Javascript. Then, the same type of analysis can be performed
over those models. However, this is still a case of multi-language analysis. The
problem is to analyze mixed-languages (in this case, Java and Javascript) in the same
application and the interaction between them. This is a completely new field, very
complex (again, with multiple scientific approaches being done) but that will be left
out of the context of this work.
5.2.5 Frameworks
During the course of this document, it was already highlighted the importance
and popularity which development frameworks have in today’s software development
process.
Even though they are so important, the fact is open source tools for security
analysis, completely ignore development frameworks. Some of them, allow the user
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to write their own rules, which gives the user some liberty to built rules which are
capable of understanding development frameworks. On the other hand, this is not
always true, because many of the tools provide their own rules mechanism, with their
own language. This mechanisms, can limit the user in a way that he can not build
rules capable of understanding anything outside a set of specified functionalities.
Frameworks are much like languages, they have a specification, which the devel-
oper must use and understand in order to perform actions. As tools need to under-
stand the language’s specification to be able to analyze it, the same thing happens
with development frameworks. Tools need to understand the framework’s specifica-
tion, in order to make analysis over it.
Of course this is not as simple as it sounds. Frameworks introduce a all new level of
complexity, mainly because they are becoming more and more user-friendly. Features
like configuration files, annotations, abstractions, etc. All the choices presented so far
in this chapter will lead to the execution process presented , make programing easier
to the developer, but harder for a tool to analyze it. However, if configured properly,
as it becomes easier to the developer, it also gives him less responsibility, reducing
significantly the risk of him introducing vulnerabilities into the application.
A good example is SQL injection. When building the ORM (object/relational
mapping), the proper use of prepared statements it’s essential in order to avoid SQL
injection. However, a less experienced developer, or even a simple mistake can lead
to a SQL injection vulnerability. ORM frameworks, if used and configured properly,
can completely remove this risk. A very good example is the Hibernate1 framework,
which uses transactions and prepared statements in every one of the operation it does,
therefore removing the chance for a SQL injection vulnerability.
This opens a wide range of possibilities on how should development frameworks
be approached, when building a security analysis tool.
A possible solution is to analyze the framework code, annotations and configu-
ration files in order to find situations of improper use of the framework. This is a
good approach, but it needs a great level of framework knowledge, and a mechanism
capable of comprehend and analyze plain text, configuration files and language code,
all together. This would also make the tool much framework-specific, making it hard
to extend the solution to multiple frameworks and forcing the limitation to a small
set of frameworks.
Another possibility, much like F4F (presented in chapter 4), is to remove the
framework specific code from the picture. This approach has the advantage of mak-
1Hibernate online page, 2013: ”http://www.hibernate.org/”
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ing it easy to extend the solution to multiple frameworks. However, it puts a lot of
responsibility on the compiler mechanism. F4F solves this by building a framework
analyzer which generates a specification of the application’s framework-related be-
havior in a simple language called WAFL. The taint analysis then uses the WAFL
specification to enhance its analysis of the application. The great advantage of this
approach is that, based on the frameworks’s specification file (WAFL), it’s possible to
remove the dependency from framework-specific code, and integrate it directly into
the application’s source code.
5.2.6 Web services
In modern applications, web services are very common as a way to communicate
with applications inside or outside the application network. If the service code is
provided, the same approach taken to parse frameworks, can be applied into web
services (or other similar communication services, including HTML5 web sockets).
The WSDL (the web service descriptor) and other configuration files (that probably
will be part of a framework used) can be parsed in order to understand the service to
be invoked. Then, the path to the service implementation can be calculated and. If
the source code is available, the service call can be treated as a regular function and
included in the CG. In this case, relation and invocations of the web service can be
threated as normal function invocations and data flow analysis can be made.
When external web services are invoked, and there is no access to the source code,
they must be considered as output (when the web service is invoked) and input (when
the application receives data from the web service).
5.2.7 Reporting
Previously in this document, it was already highlighted the importance of a quality
reporting. It’s not enough for a tool to efficiently find security vulnerabilities, if it
fails to pass that message to the user. As so, reporting is a very important part of
any tool, and it’s clearly overlooked by security open source tools.
It was explained before in this document that one of the disadvantages about static
analysis tools is the lack of precision, because they present many false positives. Also,
there are always some reported situations which users, for different reasons, may not
want to consider fixing.
This reinforces the importance for the user to be able to parametrize his reporting,
specially in big applications. As the complexity of applications grows in size, so do
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the number of possible vulnerabilities reported, making even more essential for the
user to be able to filter the information.
The best approach is for a vulnerability to be classified in two strands: category
and severity. This will allow the users to select what vulnerabilities they want to
catch or ignore or highlight, based on their category or severity.
This is not new at all. There are already several tools and proposals which allows
the user to browse bugs/vulnerabilities by their category, severity or both. These is
a very important feature for developers to define their strategies and methodologies
in their search for flaws.
A feature not usualy seen in open source tools is application history. By being able
to compare current reporting with previous versions, users can many times find pat-
terns in the their code, which can help them correcting methodologies, identify false
positives or even understand that the one they were considering as a false positive,
afterwards is not.
5.2.8 Software as a Service
As stated before, business companies moved their entire systems to the web and
people are moving their day-to-day operations to the web. This is all part of a
paradigm shift called cloud computing [Zissis and Lekkas (2012); Qian et al. (2009);
IBM (2009)].
The best approach is for the solution to be available as cloud service. The appli-
cation will run entirely in the cloud and it will be delivered to the client as a service
ready to use, in a browser, removing any installation responsibility or maintenance
from the client. In practice the user will access the platform, submit his code for
review sand receive a detailed report about the vulnerabilities in the code.
5.3 Execution Process
Based on the methodologies and tools presented in chapter 4, and all the choices
and features presented above in this chapter, it will be now described the general
architecture and processes of the solution proposed. Figure 5.2 presents a very high-
level scheme of the global execution process. Next, each of the stages from the schema
will be detailed.
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5.3.1 Execution flow
Figure 5.2: Global Workflow.
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5.3.2 Stage 1
User Input: Source code
System input: Framework descriptors
Output: Source code independent from the framework
Figure 5.3: Diagram of stage 1.
In this stage, the goal is to make the source code independent from the framework,
in which the application was built.
If a framework is not recognized by the system (the descriptor for that framework
doesn’t exist), the framework must be ignored and the analysis must continue to the
next stage.
The application in analysis may have been built using multiple frameworks. In
these cases, this stage must be applied one time for each framework, sequentally.
For example, let’s suppose that one application is built with Spring1 framework
for Java, and jWebSocket2 for web sockets. In this case, Spring must be processed
first and only then jWebSocket. The simplest way to do that is to give weights to
each category of frameworks.
If, for some reason, the code processed is not in accordance to the framework
descriptor, the user must be notified, the framework ignored, and the analysis must
continue to the next stage.
1Spring online page, 2013: ”http://www.springsource.org/spring-framework”
2jWebSocket online page, 2013: ”http://jwebsocket.org”/
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This will also ensure that, by processing one framework first, the correctness of a
second framework is compromised, then, the second framework will be ignored, the
user notified, and the analysis must continue to next stage.
5.3.3 Stage 2
User Input: None
System input: Language descriptors
Framework independent code (output from stage 1)
Output: IR models
Figure 5.4: Diagram of stage 2.
In this stage, the goal is to build all the models needed for analysis. In chapter 4,
each one of these models and data structures are explained in detail.
If the program is built over multiple languages, this stage must be done sequen-
tially. Like in the previous stage, the order in which the languages are processed
should be determined by its importance.
For example, if an application built in Java with HTML and Javascript, Java
must be processed first. As stated before, this is not ideal, as the interactions and
relationships between those languages should be target of analysis. However, this
mixed-language systems fall out of the context of this work.
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If the application was built with multiple languages, and one of them is not recog-
nized by the system, then that language must be ignored and the other ones processed
normally. If none of the languages are recognized, the analysis must stop and not
proceed to the next stage. Also, the user must be notified that the system is not
capable to perform the analysis on the application.
One the main goals of the solution is for it to be able to analyze Java and HTML5
at the same time. With this approach this is possible as Java will be parsed and the
corresponding IR models built. Then, sequentially, HTML5 will be independently
parsed and the corresponding IR models built.
Parsing the application source code is a process performed by multiple tools and
frameworks. Some of them are open source and very easy to use and extend. Are ex-




System input: Security Patterns
IR models (output from stage 2)
Output: Analysis results persisted on DB
Figure 5.5: Diagram of stage 3.1.
1ANTLR - ANother Tool for Language Recognition online page, 2013: ”http://www.antlr.org/”)
2JavaCC - Java Compiler Compiler online page, 2013: ”http://javacc.java.net/”
3Apache BCEL online page, 2013: ”http://commons.apache.org/proper/commons-bcel/”
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After building the IR models, the execution process takes two different paths,
corresponding with the two step process described in the basics of this chapter.
This is the stage where a pattern based analysis is made, in order to find bad
practices and coding errors that may lead to security vulnerabilities. The goal is to
verify the security patterns against the IR models generated in the previous stage.
The quality of the analysis will be proportional with the quality the security patterns.
This stage can be simplified by using PQL, the query language presented in chapter
4. PQL system performs the analysis based on PQL queries. In this case, the security
patterns would be built in the form of PQL queries. So, by using PQL system, there
is not much to be done besides building the security queries or let the user build
them.
Of course there is also an integration effort in order to integrate PQL into the
application core. This integration consists mainly on adapting the IR models from
the previous stage, in order to pass them as input to PQL system.
Of course, using PQL is only one option. There are multiple pattern-based analysis
algorithms, and implementing from scratch is always a possibility.
In the end of this stage, the analysis results will not be directly generated into a
report. Instead, the results will be persisted into the database (where can also be the




System input: Language Descriptors
IR models (output from stage 2)
Output: Analysis results persisted on DB
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Figure 5.6: Diagram of stage 3.2.
This stage performs taint based data flow analysis and has the main goal of find-
ing XSS vulnerabilities. Like any other data flow analysis, this stage can be easily
extended to identify other data flow vulnerabilities.
As stated before, in order to this stage to be easily extended to multiple languages,
the IR models must be first abstracted into common models. In practice, this means
that all specifics from the language must be removed. With this approach, the same
analysis methodologies can be applied over Java or .NET, for example.
To detect XSS vulnerabilities, an intra and inter procedural taint based analysis
is then applied over the common models. More advanced algorithms (like the thin
slicing used in TAJ), can also be considered to improve efficiency.
As in stage 3.1, the analysis results will be persisted into the database and not
directly compiled into a report. These records will be processed in stage 4.
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User Input: None
System input: Previous analysis
Current Analysis (output from stage 3)
Output: User report
5.3.6 Stage 4
Figure 5.7: Diagram of stage 4.
The goal in this stage is to build the final report which will be presented to the user.
To do this, the current analysis must be compared to the last analysis performed over
the same application. By doing this, it will be possible to show the user the evolution
achieved over time. For example, the user will be able to see what vulnerabilities he
has fixed, what vulnerabilities are new and what vulnerabilities he forgot or ignored.
Also, like stated before, vulnerabilities must be characterized by their severity and
category, allowing the user to easily filter the information.
Decent open source reporting tools are available. BIRT1 and JASPER reports2
are two very good examples, and can be very useful in this stage. They include
very important features, like user basic interaction, graphics, charts, multi-format
exporting, web based reporting, etc.
1BIRT online page, 2013: ”http://community.jaspersoft.com/project/jasperreports-library”
2Hibernate online page, 2013: ”http://www.eclipse.org/birt/phoenix/”
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5.4 Summary
During this chapter, a set of guidelines were defined over some features considered
critical when building a static analysis tools. These features are usually not seen
in the open source static analysis tools available today and are essential to build a
platform capable of performing analysis over a modern and complex web application:
• Be developed as a software as a service.
• Be interactive and integrate good reporting services.
• Be context-sensitive.
• Be built upon security patterns.
• Be capable of analyzing applications built with development frameworks.
• Be capable of analyzing applications built upon mixed-languages.
• Support multiple languages.
The list of features presented are essential for a tool to keep up with the constant
changing in web applications and web development.
Was also presented and described a high-level proposal for the execution process
of a platform capable of analyzing the security of a web application. It’s a process
with four main stages, each one described more detailed, and capable of integrating
multiple languages, multiple development frameworks and to perform two types of
analysis: data flow and pattern based analysis.
Another conclusion from this chapter and from this work is that reviewing the
security of a HTML5 application is a two step process. First, a tainted data flow
analysis must be done over the business layer in order to identify XSS vulnerabilities.
The second step is to perform a pattern based analysis over the presentation layer
to ensure that the most critical features of HTML5 are properly implemented, and




This work starts by making a detailed survey about web security, the main vulner-
abilities seen on web applications today, and how they are evolving with the emerging
of new technologies, specially the new HTML5 specification. Then, a complete anal-
ysis over static analysis tools and techniques is made, in order to understand the
process of building a static analysis tool. It became clear what is missing on open
source tools, and how can the already existent methodologies be used in HTML5
security analysis.
One biggest conclusion which comes out of this work is that one application con-
taining HTML5 is only as secure as the business layer is, and the main threat against
HTML5 does not come from the HTML5 specification itself but from XSS vulnera-
bilities. So, one application looking only for HTML5 specific vulnerabilities may lead
to a false sensation of security. Reviewing the security of HTML5 applications is a
two step process:
The first step is to ensure that no XSS vulnerabilities are present in the application.
XSS vulnerabilities are considered data flow vulnerabilities and so, to find XSS, data
flow analysis must be done. To perform data flow analysis, a set of three main IR
models must be built (at least), and algorithms like pointer analysis, single statement
assessment or taint analysis must be used based on top of those IR models.
The second step, is to find HTML5 bad practices and coding errors. As HTML5
is, by nature, a secure language the main source of security vulnerabilities introduced
by this new language will be programmer coding errors. To find this coding errors, a
pattern based analysis must be done, looking for patterns in the code that are known
to introduce security vulnerabilities.
Modern web applications are complex systems, built with different languages and
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technologies. This reinforces the need for static analysis not to ignore the multi
and mixed languages systems, the frameworks in which the application was built,
communication services (like web services) or even the integration of external libraries
and features. To contemplate these features, more advanced static analysis techniques
are also needed.
6.1 Output
At the beginning of this work, two main objectives were defined: the first one
was to provide a survey on the state of web security, understand the security vul-
nerabilities currently seen in web applications and understand how they are evolving
with the emerging of new technologies and methodologies, specially HTML5. The
second objective was to define a set of guidelines and a proposal for a high level
model of a platform capable of perform static analysis over complex and modern web
applications.
The first contribution is divided between chapters 2 and 3. Chapter 2 starts by an-
alyzing the OWASP Top 10 and all the main vulnerabilities seen on web applications
today. Then, in chapter 3, a detailed analysis over the new features of HTML5 is made
along with a security analysis over the possible new attacking vectors introduced by
HTML5.
The second contribution is mainly made in chapter 5. However, chapter 4 is very
important because it establishes the background for all the strategies, methodologies
and tools mentioned in chapter 5. During chapter 5, a set of features were identi-
fied as being the most important to allow a static analysis tool to keep up with the
growing complexity of web applications. Finally, it was presented a very high-level
architecture, divided in four stages, and capable of integrating multiple languages
and multiple development frameworks. The process is divided mainly between two
methodologies: it uses data flow analysis mainly over the business layer of the ap-
plication (which will allow it, for example, to identify vulnerabilities like Injection or
XSS) and uses pattern based analysis mainly over the presentation layer (which will
allow it, for example, to identify vulnerabilities due to HTML5 poor implementation).
6.2 Future Work
In the solution proposed in this document, only static analysis specifics (like data
structures, algorithms and methodologies) are specified, but implementation details
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(like the architecture of the application, database schemas, etc.) were left out.
The next step would be do put this approach into the form of an application,
defining all the implementation details and solving all the possible problems that
could come up within that process.
Also, during the course of the document, two areas were identify as being very
important but were left out, due to their complexity. The first is mixed-systems
analysis, which is needed in almost every modern web applications. The second is
reverse engineering techniques for program refactoring, in order to be able to recover
code that is either not available or compiled. This is specially important when external
libraries are used in a web application. With reverse engineering techniques, these
libraries could be decompiled into source code, and the analysis could be extended to
the library itself.
These two areas are very important, but also very complex, and each one would
require it’s own independent research. As so, for future work, it would be interesting
to study a possible integration of these two concepts into the solution presented.
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